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Relatively little has been written about equitable relief under state and fed­
eral antitrust laws.1 Equity power in antitrust enforcement means much more 
than the mere power to restrain a defendant from doing an act for which the 
plaintiff has no “remedy at law,” to order a defendant to remove a nuisance 
disturbing some equitably recognized right of a plaintiff, or to restrain a defen­
dant from using his property in a manner which will interfere with another’s 
rights. In antitrust, the proverbial chancellor’s foot has grown to truly vast 
proportions. Antitrust equity jurisdiction entails a language all its own: con­
sent decrees, divestiture, dissolution, and divorcement. Equitable relief in an 
antitrust case may well extend beyond the point of economic correction to be­
come, in effect, economic regulation of an entire industry or segment thereof 
for several generations.
Concurrent with the grant of equity power in antitrust is the power of the 
government to proceed criminally.2 Since a Sherman or Clayton Act violation 
can also be a violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,3 the 
F.T.G. and the Antitrust Division may proceed simultaneously against the 
same defendant for the same act.4
This article is primarily concerned with some of the recurring problems of 
federal antitrust injunctive relief and the unexplored area of injunctive relief 
under state antitrust laws. Very often the remedy is as important as the sub­
f  Research for this study was supported by funds provided by the Legislative Re­
search Center of the University of Michigan Law School, funds derived from gifts to the 
University of Michigan by William W. Cook, and funds provided by the Research Com­
mittee of the University of Utah. This study is in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the S.J.D. degree, University of Michigan. The views expressed herein are those of 
the author, and do not necessarily represent the views of any of the sponsors of this re­
search.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Utah.
1 See generally M. G oldberg , T h e  C o n s e n t  D ecree  : I t s  Fo r m u latio n  an d  U se 
(1962); U.S. D ep ’ t  o f  Ju stic e , A t t ’y  G en ’ s N a t ’ l  C o m m . T o  St u d y  t h e  A n t it r u s t  
L a w s  343 (1955); Brown, Injunctions and Divestiture, in ABA Sectio n  o f  A n t itr u s t  
L a w , A n  A n t it r u s t  H an dboo k  535 (1958); Fraidin, Dissolution and Reconstruction: 
A Structural Remedy, and Alternatives, 33 G eo . W a s h . L. R ev . 899 (1965); Tim berg, 
Equitable Relief Under the Sherman Act, 1950 U . III. L. F. 629; W ithrow , A Defense 
Counsel’s View of a Government Civil Antitrust Suit, 3 A n t it r u s t  B u l l . 49 (1958); 
Note, Consent Decrees and the Private Action: An Antitrust Dilemma, 53 C a l if . L. R ev . 
627 (1965); Note, Developments in the Law—Injunctions, 78 H arv . L . R ev . 994
(1965); Note, Divestiture of Illegally Held Assets: Observations on Its Scope, Objec­
tive, and Limitations, 64 M ic h . L. R ev . 1574 (1966).
2 One of the criticisms of federal enforcement has been the filing of companion civil 
and criminal cases against the same defendant for the same violation. The charge has 
often been made that the criminal case is used as a lever to exert pressure in the negotia­
tions concerning civil relief. If such is the case, it would seem to be an abuse of the 
criminal process.
3 FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 690-93 (1948); Fashion Originator’s
Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); see FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing 
Co., 257 U.S. 441,453-55 (1922).
* FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683,694—95 (1948).
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stantive issues in a lawsuit; but just as in war, the remedial phase of the contest 
does not receive commensurate attention. This is particularly true of antitrust 
injunctive relief, where the effect the remedy can or should have may be of 
far-reaching economic consequence. The grant of equity power to the courts 
under state and federal antitrust laws and the nature of the subject matter they 
are designed to operate upon, however, have tempered judicial exercise of that 
power.5 The overall function of this article is to evaluate the limitations upon 
the judicial process vis-a-vis the need for adequate injunctive relief to remedy 
the substantive problems raised in antitrust litigation.
I . S o u r c e s  o f  E q u it y  J u r is d ic t io n
A. Statutory Basis
Section 4 of the Sherman Act6 and section 15 of the Clayton Act7 empower 
the Attorney General "to institute proceedings in equity to prevent and re­
strain” violations of the antitrust laws. Section 11 of the Clayton Act8 author­
izes the Federal Trade Commission to issue cease and desist orders against per­
sons violating the Robinson-Patman Act,9 section 7 of the Clayton A ct/0 and 
section 3 of the Clayton Act.11 Section 5 (b) of the Federal Trade Commission 
Act authorizes the Commission to issue cease and desist orders against persons 
using "any unfair method of competition or unfair or deceptive act or practice 
in commerce.”12 Congress completed the grant of equity power in section 16 of 
the Clayton Act by authorizing a private party to bring suit for injunctive relief 
under the antitrust laws.13
At the state level, authority for equitable relief is less clear. In some states 
both public and private equitable relief is available, in some one or the other, in 
others neither, and in still other states the question never seems to have arisen. 
Several state antitrust laws expressly authorize injunctive relief at the request
'Judge Wyzanski’s comment concerning the breadth of power conferred upon 
federal judges in antitrust cases is perhaps the best known:
In the anti-trust field the courts have been accorded, by common consent, an 
authority they have in no other branch of enacted law. . . . They would not 
have been given, or allowed to keep, such authority in the anti-trust field, and 
they would not so freely have altered from time to time the interpretation of 
its substantive provisions, if courts were in the habit of proceeding with the 
surgical ruthlessness that might commend itself to those seeking absolute as­
surance that there will be workable competition, and to those aiming at im­
mediate realization of the social, political, and economic advantages of disper­
sal of power.
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 348 (D. Mass. 1953), 
a fd  per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
*15 U.S.C. §4  (1964).
T 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1964). See also 15 U.S.C. § 9 (1964), granting equity power to 
prevent and restrain combinations in import trade.
8 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1964). Section 11 of the Clayton Act also authorizes the I.C.G., 
F.C.C., C.A.B., and F.R.B. to prevent certain types of restraints of trade in certain 
regulated industries.
• 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1964).
1015 U.S.C. § 18 (1964) (mergers).
u 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1964) (interlocking directorates).
“ 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1964).
"  15 U.S.C. § 26 (1964).
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of state officials,14 while a lesser number of state statutes authorize private per­
sons to seek equitable relief for antitrust violations injuring them.15 In some 
states in which express statutory authority to enjoin antitrust violations has not 
been given state enforcement officials, judicial decisions have assumed or im­
plied equitable enforcement powers.18 And, in many of the states with anti­
trust laws which do not expressly authorize private parties to sue for equitable 
relief, courts have granted equitable relief at the instance of private suitors17 
The various justifications for allowing private parties to seek equitable relief, 
despite an absence of express statutory authority, have included the inadequacy
M See, e.g., A r k . St a t . A n n . § 70-108 (1957) (limited to monopolies); Ga l . Bu s . 
& Pr o f . C ode § 16754.5 (West 1964); C o lo . R e v . St a t . A n n . § 55-4-5 (1963); 
H a w a ii R e v . L a w s  § 205A-13 (Supp. 1965); I d a h o  C ode A n n . § 48-112 (1948); 
I I I .  A n n . St a t . ch. 38, § 60-7(1) (Smith-Hurd 1966); I n d . A n n . Sta t . § 23-120
(1964); I o w a  C ode A n n . § 551.9 (1950); K a n . G e n . St a t . A n n . § 50-105 (1964); 
L a . C o n s t , art. 19, § 14; L a . R e v . St a t . § 13.5088 (1951); L a . R ev . St a t . § 51.128
(1965); M a s s . G e n . L a w s  A n n . ch . 93, § 3 (1954); M in n . St a t . A n n . §§ 623.02, 
623.03 (1966); M is s . C ode A n n . § 1088 (1956); M o . A n n . St a t . § 416.260(2) 
(1952); M o n t . R e v . C ode A n n . § 94-1108 (1947); N e b . R ev . St a t . §§ 59-810, -813, 
-814, -819 (1960); N .Y . G e n . Bu s . L a w  § 342 (M cK in n ey  1957); N.C. G e n . St a t . 
§ 75-14 (1965); N.D. C e n t . C ode § 51-10-06 (Supp. 1965); O h io  R ev . C ode A n n . § 
1331.11 (P age 1962); O k l a . St a t . A n n . tit. 79, §§ 21,22 (1965); S.D. C ode § 13.1808
(1939); U t a h  C ode A n n . §§ 50-1-7, 50-1-9 (Repl. vol. 1960) (compulsory dissolution 
of corporation which restrains trade or creates monopoly); V a . C ode A n n . § 59-33 
(1950); W a s h . R ev . C ode A n n . § 19.86.080 (Supp. 1966); W is . St a t . A n n . § 133.02 
(Supp. 1967). Several states also expressly authorize charter forfeiture and ouster of 
corporations, this being a particularized form of equitable relief comparable to the rem­
edy of dissolution in federal antitrust proceedings.
15 H a w a ii R e v . L a w s  § 205A-11 (Supp. 1965); I I I .  A n n . St a t . ch. 38, § 60-7 (2) 
(Smith-Hurd 1966); L a . R e v . St a t . § 51.129 (West 1965); N.D. C e n t . C ode § 51-10­
06 (Supp. 1965); V a . C ode A n n . § 59-32 (1950); W a s h . R ev . C ode A n n . § 19.86.090 
(S u p p .1966).
15 See, e.g., People v. Aachen & Munich Fire Ins. Co. of Germany, 126 111. App. 
636 (1905); Hunt v. Riverside Co-op. Club, 140 Mich. 538, 104 N.W. 40 (1905).
”  See Ala.: Dothan Oil Mill Co. v. Espy, 220 Ala. 605, 127 So. 178 (1930). Cal.: 
Kold Kist, Inc. v. Meat Cutters & Butchers Local 421, 99 Cal. App. 2d 191, 221 P.2d 
724 (1950). Contra, Overland Pub. Co. v. Union Lithograph Co., 57 Cal. App. 366, 207 
P. 412 (1922). Ga.: Blackmon v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 179 Ga. 343, 175 S.E. 798 (1934). 
III.: Inter-Ocean Pub. Go. v. Associated Press, 184 111. 438, 56 N.E. 822 (1900). Ind.: 
Knight & Jillson Co. v. Miller, 172 Ind. 27, 87 N.E. 823 (1909). Mich.: Peoples Sav. 
Bank v. Stoddard, 359 Mich. 297, 102 N.W.2d 777 (1960). Minn.: Campbell v. Mo­
tion Picture Mach. Operators Local 219, 151 Minn. 220, 186 N.W. 781 (1922). Mo.: 
Lohse Patent Door Co. v. Fuelle, 215 Mo. 421, 114 S.W. 997 (1908). Contra, C.H. 
Albers Gomm’n Co. v. Spencer, 205 Mo. 105, 103 S.W. 523 (1907), rehearing denied 
sub nom., C.H. Albers Comm’n Go. v. Milliken, 245 Mo. 368, 150 S.W. 712 (1912), 
appeal dismissed per curiam for want of jurisdiction, 232 U.S. 719 (1913). N.H.: Cur­
rier v. Concord R.R., 48 N.H. 321 (1869) (railroad merger). N.J.: Barrv. Essex Trades 
Council, 53 N.J. Eq. 101, 30 A. 881 (Ch. 1894). N.Y.: Eagle Spring Water Go. v. Webb 
& Knapp, Inc., 236 N.Y.S.2d 266 (Sup. Gt. 1962). N.C.: Burke Transit Co. v. Queen 
City Coach Co., 228 N.C. 768, 47 S.E.2d 297 (1948). Okla.: Anderson v. Shawnee 
Compress Co., 17 Okla. 231, 87 P. 315 (1906), aff’d, 209 U.S. 423 (1908). Pa.: 
Schwartz v. Laundry & Linen Supply Drivers Local 187, 339 Pa. 353, 14 A.2d 438
(1940). Contra, Tibby Bros. Glass Co. v. Pennsylvania R .R ., 219 Pa. 430, 68 A. 975
(1908) (railroad merger). Tex.: Turner v. Zanes, 206 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1947). Wash.: Group Health Co-op. v. King County Medical Soc’y, 39 Wash. 2d 586, 
237 P.2d 737 (1951). Washington’s new antitrust statute provides for private equitable 
relief. W a s h . R e v . C ode A n n . § 19.86.090 (Supp. 1966).
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of the remedy at law,18 irreparable harm,19 the unascertainability of damages,20 
protection of a stockholder’s right to enjoin voting of stock held illegally by 
another,21 the multiplicity of lawsuits,22 and the prevention of malicious inter­
ference with contractual or property rights.23 State antitrust law has become 
a hodgepodge of equity jurisdiction in need of substantial reform if state en­
forcement is to be revived and fairly applied to interstate commercial activity.
B. Common Lam Basis
The growth of equity as an Anglo-American institution was enhanced by 
the hardening of the arteries of the common law.24 Indeed, the rigidity of the 
common law was facilitated by the institution of equity.
With the crystallization of the common law forms of action, equity de­
veloped as a supplement to the law, providing a remedy where the law courts 
would not or could not, or, in general, providing a remedy where the remedy at 
law was inadequate.25 But equitable relief has gradually expanded beyond 
many of its maxims and no longer should be considered as merely supplemental 
to the law. For example, the old equity maxim that "equity protects property 
rights, not personal rights,”28 has been rejected by many courts.27 The maxim 
that equity will not enjoin the commission of a crime, apparently because of the 
adequacy of the “remedy” at law, has been eroded.28 The institution of equity 
is used today when the advantages of its procedure or its remedies are superior 
to those of the traditional actions at law and when it can be applied within the 
restrictions of state and federal constitutional guarantees of a jury trial.
Several factors promote the availability of equitable relief. Difficulty in 
ascertaining damages,29 multiplicity of suits,30 and absence of realistic damage
18 See, e.g., Tallassee Oil & Fertilizer Go. v. Holloway, 200 Ala. 492, 76 So. 434 
(1917); Schwartz v. Laundry & Linnen Supply Drivers’ Local 187, 339 Pa. 353, 14 
A.2d438 (1940) (Pennsylvania has no general antitrust law).
19See, e.g., Dothan Oil Mill Go. v. Espy, 220 Ala. 605, 127 So. 178 (1930); Group 
Health Co-op. v. King County Medical Soc’y, 39 Wash 2d. 586, 237 P.2d 737 (1951).
101See, e.g., Kold Kist, Inc. v. Meat Cutters & Butchers Local 421, 99 Cal. App. 2d 
191, 221 P.2d 724 (1950); Brown v. Jacobs Pharmacy Co., 115 Ga. 429. 41 S.E. 553 
(1902).
a Dunbar v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 238 111. 456, 87 N.E. 521 (1909).
9 See Kold East, Inc. v. Meat Cutters & Butchers Local 421, 99 Gal. App. 2d 191, 
221 P.2d 724 (1950); Schwartz v. Laundry & Linen Supply Drivers Local 187, 339 Pa. 
353,14 A.2d 438 (1940).
** Employing Printers’ Club v. Doctor Blosser Co., 122 Ga. 509, 50 S.E. 353 (1905) : 
Barr v. Essex Trades Council, 53 N.J. Eq. 101,30 A. 881 (Ch. 1894).
311See generally T. P l u c k n e t t , A C o n c i s e  H i s t o r y  o f  t h e  C o m m o n  L a w  
150—51, 168—72 (4th ed. 1948) ;  Adams, The Origin of English Equity, 16 C o l u m . L . 
R e v . 87 (1916).
^ See generally 1 J . P o m e r o y ,  E q u i t y  J u r i s p r u d e n c e  §§ l-42a (5th ed. 1941). 
For an excellent survey of the equitable remedy of injunction see Note, Developments in 
the Law— Injunctions, 78 H a r v . L. R e v . 994 (1965).
24 The maxim apparently stems from Lord Eldon’s opinion in Gee v. Pritchard, 36 
Eng. Rep. 670 (Ch. 1818).
w See, e.g., Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf Club, Inc., 30 Cal. 2d 110, 180 P.2d 321 
(1947) ;  Kenyon v. City of Chicopee, 320 Mass. 528, 70 N.E.2d 241 (1946).
23 Note, supra note 25, at 1014—21,1024-27.
23 See, e.g., Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf Club, Inc., 30 Cal. 2d 110, 180 P.2d 321
(1947); Duke of Somerset v. Cookson, 24 Eng. Rep. 1114 (Ch. 1735).
w Note, supra note 25, at 1001; see cases cited note 22 supra.
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relief31 have all been mentioned as factors which are avoided by equitable re­
lief. Factors cited as militating against equitable relief usually include the pro­
cedural hardships to a defendant of no jury trial,32 the fact that equitable relief 
in the form of an injunction often imposes limitations upon the freedom of the 
individual,33 and the possibility that a court of equity may be unable to enforce 
its decree.34
Injunctive relief is usually divided into three categories: temporary re­
straining orders, preliminary injunctions, and permanent injunctions.35 The 
temporary restraining order may be granted upon ex parte request, is for a 
limited period of time, is self-dissolving, and is generally not appealable; the 
preliminary injunction may be granted after a limited hearing on affidavits, 
lasts pending the outcome of a trial on the merits, and is appealable; the per­
manent injunction is granted only after a full hearing on the merits, is said to 
be perpetual,86 and is, of course, appealable. A further distinction is drawn 
between mandatory and prohibitory injunctions:37 many courts declare that a 
stronger showing of the necessity for injunctive relief is necessary when a man­
datory injunction is sought.38
I I .  P u b l ic  I n j u n c t iv e  R e l ie f
A. Federal Antitrust Cases
Injunctive relief is especially well suited to the enforcement of the antitrust 
laws. State and federal statutes have as their general purpose the “promotion 
of competition in open markets,”39 and theoretically insure the greatest effi­
ciency at the lowest price and best service to the consumer, with the most ap­
propriate allocation of resources. The flexible remedy of injunction is the only 
civil device available, within the context of a judicially enforced antitrust 
policy, for achieving these ends in a market clogged by anticompetitive re­
straints. During the first seventy years of federal antitrust law enforcement, 
615 of the 770 civil antitrust cases instituted by the Department of Justice were 
pursued to some type of equitable remedy. One hundred thirty-eight of the
31 Note, supra note 25, at 1001—02.
33 In Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 509-10 (1959), Mr. Justice 
Black suggested that the Declaratory Judgment Act and the Federal Rules of Civil Pro­
cedure, when viewed in light of the seventh amendment, may have a limiting effect upon 
the availability of equitable relief.
33 See Note, supra note 25, at 1008—12.
31 Id. at 1012-13; see United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 
161-66 (1948).
35 This is the classification followed under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See 
F e d , R. C i v . P. 65.
35 But see Note, Are All Permanent Injunctions Temporary?, 23 M i c h . L. R e v . 382 
(1925).
81 Apparently, this distinction may also be traced to Lord Eldon. See Lane v. 
Newdigate, 32 Eng. Rep. 818 (Ch. 1804).
38 Note, supra note 25, at 1061.
39 U .S .  D e p ’ t  o f  J u s t ic e ,  A t t ’ y  G e n ’ s  N a t ’ l  C o m m . T o  S t u d y  t h e  A n t i t r u s t
L a w s  1 (1955) (footnote omitted). See generally Loevinger, Antitrust, Economics and
Politics, 1 A n t i t r u s t  B u l l . 225 (1955).
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cases terminated in injunctive orders following litigation, while the remainder 
ended in consent decrees.40
The incidents of equitable relief under the federal antitrust laws are well 
known. The antitrust injunction is remedial in nature, and is designed to eli­
minate the vestiges of transgressions of the past and to prohibit future viola­
tions —  not to punish defendants for illegal anticompetitive conduct.41 The 
government’s equitable enforcement power is intended to be used on behalf of 
the public and, therefore, an injunctive decree in private litigation does not 
render a subsequent government suit for equitable relief against the same de­
fendant for the same anticompetitive conduct a useless exercise.42 Nor is inter­
vention by private litigants in an equity case which is being prosecuted for pub­
lic benefit easily obtained.43 The express authorization of equitable relief at 
the government’s instance serves the dual function of protecting the public 
from the continuation of conduct in violation of antitrust principles and of pre­
venting future violations.
Since the Attorney General is authorized to “institute proceedings in equity 
to prevent and restrain . . .  violations”44 of the antitrust laws, the kinds of en- 
joinable conduct are many and varied. Vertical45 and horizontal4® price fixing, 
tying contracts,47 concerted refusals to deal by sellers48 and buyers,49 allocation
C om piled  from : C o m m e r c e  C le a r in g  H o u s e , In c ., T h e  F e d e r a l A n t i t r u s t  
L a w s  w i t h  S u m m a r y  o f  G a s e s  I n s t i t u t e d  b y  t h e  U n ite d  S t a t e s  1890-1951
(1952) (popu larly  known as the CCH Blue Book) ;  T h e  Federal Antitrust Laws with 
Summary o f  Gases Instituted b y  the U nited  States 1952-1956 Supplem ent (1957); U .S. 
Antitrust Gases Summaries 1957-1961 (G G H  Transfer Binder 1961).
"Pursued to remedy” means the government won its case against one or more de­
fendants and was granted some form of injunctive relief. One hundred thirty-nine cases 
were dismissed or otherwise disposed of prior to a litigated judgment. Sixteen civil cases 
instituted prior to 1960 were still pending at the time these computations were made.
"  Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386,409 (1945).
“ United States v. Borden Co., 347 U.S. 514 (1954). The government has little 
control over the formulation of private decrees and is unable to enforce a private decree 
by contempt proceedings or to seek modification to meet changing circumstances.
43 See, e.g., United States v. General Elec. Co., 95 F. Supp. 165 (D.N.J. 1950). 
Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129 (1967), may have 
somewhat relaxed the standards for interventon under Rule 24(a) of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure. It has been persuasively argued, however, that the El Paso case will 
be limited to its special facts —  particularly the fact that the Court viewed the lower 
court divestiture decree and the government’s acquiesence therein as a violation of its 
mandate in a previous appeal by the government in the same case. United States v. El 
Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964); see Analysis, BNA’s A n t i t r u s t  & T r a d e  
R e g . R e p . No. 301 B-l (April 18,1967).
The discretion to bring a suit or not is absolute in the Attorney General. Parker v. 
Kennedy, 212 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
** Sherman Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1964); Clayton Act § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 25 
(1964).
^ See, e.g,, United States v.'New Wrinkle, Inc., 342 U.S. 371 (1952); United 
States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
“ See, e.g., United States v. National Ass’n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485 
(1950).
47 See, e.g., International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); Inter­
national Bus. Machs. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936).
43 Fashion Originators’ Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) (cease 
and desist order); United States v. First Nat’l Pictures, Inc., 282 U.S. 44 (1930).
°  See, e.g., Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers’ Ass’n v. United States, 234 U.S. 
600 (1914).
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of territories50 and customers,51 setting production quotas/2 monopolization/3 
restraints of trade by abuse of the patent monopoly/4 and mergers in violation 
of section 7 of the Clayton Act55 have all been enjoined by mandatory or pro­
hibitory injunctions. Relief has included divestiture/6 mandatory rental of a 
violator’s patented machines at reasonable rates/7 prohibition of bid rigging/8 
prohibition of entering into otherwise legal contractual agreements/9 the re­
quirement that lessees of patented machines be given an option to continue 
leasing or to buy/0 invalidation of lease and other contractual arrangements/1 
the enjoining of lawsuits/2 and dissolution63 and divorcement.84 In United 
States v. Grinnell Corp. / 5 a civil suit seeking to break up monopolization of the 
automatic fire and burglar alarm business, Judge Wyzanski went so far as to 
enjoin the corporate defendants from hiring the president of the primary cor­
porate defendant, thereby as a practical matter excluding the president from 
further work in the field involved.68 Judge Wyzanski justified this result by 
applying normal antitrust equity principles to a situation he thought unique:
[T]o insure that the reforms imposed by this decree are not thwarted 
by a leader of great capacity but of less than an admirable record of 
compliance with well-known prescriptions of antitrust law, and to guar­
antee that there is an entirely effective breakxng-up of the channels of
601See, e.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951) ;  
Addyston Pipe Sc Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
a See, e.g., United States v. Servel, Inc., 1954 Trade Gas. fl 67,665 (E.D. Pa.) 
(consent decree)j United States v. Decca Records, Inc., 1952 Trade Cas. f[ 67,402 
(S.D.N.Y.) (consent decree).
a See, e.g., Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945).
113 See j e.g., United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948); United States v. Singer 
Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963).
a See, e.g., Hartford-Empire Go. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945) ;  United 
States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963).
651See, e.g., United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964); Brown 
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
“See, e.g., United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964); United 
States v. Grinnell Corp., 236 F. Supp. 244 (D.R.I. 1964), aff’d and remanded, 384 U.S. 
563 (1966).
"United States v. Continental Can Co., 128 F. Supp. 932 (N.D. Cal. 1955).
53 See United States v. Ward Baking Co., 376 U.S. 327 (1964).
United States v. United Liquors Corp., 149 F. Supp. 609 (W.D. Tenn. 1956), 
afi’d per curiam, 352 U.S. 991 (1957).
60 Besser Mfg. Co. v. United States, 343 U.S. 444 (1952).
81 International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); Hartford-Empire 
Go. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945).
63 Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386,419 (1945).
631See, e.g., Hughes v. United States, 342 U.S. 353 (1952): Hartford-Empire Co. 
v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945).
61 See, e.g., United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948). 
Divorcement is a special form of divestiture designed to secure relief against abuses of 
integrated ownership or control by requiring divestiture of assets used in or causing verti­
cal or horizontal restraints of trade. See Oppenheim, Divestiture as a Remedy Under 
the Federal Antitrust Laws•— Economic Background, 19 G e o . W a s h . L. R e v . 119, 
120-21 (1950).
“  236 F. Supp. 244 (D.R.I. 1964), aff’d and remanded, 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
60 The corporate defendants enjoined from hiring the defendant-president con­
trolled 87 %  of the automatic fire and police alarm business. If Judge Wyzanski’s assess­
ment of the president’s conduct were accurate, it seems unlikely that the companies hav­
ing the remainder of the business would hire him.
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restraint and monopolization which the present management of Grin- 
nel has dug so deep into the pattern of the CSPS accredited industry, 
and to make certain that the general public is not further prejudiced by 
the continued management of defendants by one who has demonstrated 
defiance of legal prohibitions, no defendant, after April 1, 1966, shall 
continue in employment as officer, director, employee, consultant, agent 
or otherwise James Douglas Fleming; but nothing herein shall preclude 
any defendant from fulfilling any pension or like purely financial ar­
rangement it now has with Mr. Fleming. . . .  This provision shall not 
be construed as in any respect retroactive or punitive; its interpretation 
shall be strictly prospective and prophylactic; nor shall it be regarded 
as directed against Mr. Fleming, but against defendants’ use of Mr. 
Fleming, the leader who brought them to this end and cannot be ex­
pected to regard a reversal of his policies as suitable marching orders. 
While this Court does not feel that it can leave Mr. Fleming in the 
saddle, there is [not] intended in this decretal provision, or in any other 
part of this opinion and judgment any suggestion that Mr. Fleming 
lacks financial integrity or honesty of the usual type. He is an “honest 
man” after the manner of Theodore Roosevelt or Norman Hapgood.. . .
He is undoubtedly a man whose virtue the Scotch would appreciate, and 
of a V IR TU  the Italians would applaud. But he appears on this rec­
ord to have been for well over a decade and a half the vigorous captain 
of the defendants’ conspiracy to monopolize.67
On appeal to the Supreme Court the defendants urged and the government 
conceded that the barring of Mr. Fleming from the employment of any of the 
corporate defendants was unduly harsh and quite unnecessary. The Court 
agreed that the record did not require such relief while noting that relief of this 
kind “may be appropriate where the predatory conduct is conspicuous. . .  ,”68 
As is perhaps evident from the Grinnell case, the averment that equitable 
relief is remedial and not punitive has little more content than most of the 
other meaningless maxims of equity. To suggest that the dispossession of cor­
porate office is directed toward the offending corporation rather than the cor­
porate officer who formulated, directed, and carried out policies violating the 
antitrust laws only compounds the fiction. The remedy of dissolution of the 
combination and a general injunction prohibiting future violations upon pain 
of criminal contempt should serve to deter the most vigorous captain of any 
conspiracy to monopolize or restrain trade.
A  crossing of the theoretical line dividing remedial from punitive antitrust 
remedies seems prevalent, albeit necessary, in many injunctive decrees. There 
is no doubt that the courts may not create new duties, prescription of which is 
the function of Congress; or place the defendants for the future in a different 
class than other people; or issue a decree which enjoins all possible breaches of 
the law; or issue a decree which is so vague as to put the whole conduct of the
”  236 F. Supp. at 259-60. The remedy is not quite as unique as some may think.
Certain criminal acts may bar union officers from holding office under the Landrum-
Griffin Bill. 29 U.S.C. § 504 (1964). Section 8 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 19
(1964), forbids interlocking directorates among competitors. See United States v. Sears, 
Roebuck & Co., 165 F. Supp. 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), wherein a corporate officer was re­
quired to give up his position with either Sears or B.F. Goodrich Company and was 
restrained from accepting a position as trustee of the Sears pension trust fund.
03 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 579 (1966).
HeinOnline -- 1967 Utah L. Rev. 351 1967
352 UTAH LAW REVIEW [1967: 344
defendant’s business at the peril of a summons for contempt; or cause the de­
fendants hereafter not to be under the protection of the law.69 But injunctive 
relief has been used for disgorgement of ill-gotten gain,70 prevention of possible 
as well as proven violations,71 and as a means for affirmative government regu­
lation of a particular business or market.72 While the use of equitable relief for 
these purposes may be somewhat less than penal, it is also something more than 
merely remedial.
The use of an equitable remedy to obtain something more than remedial 
relief should not necessarily be condemned. For example, the use of injunctive 
power to force disgorgement of ill-gotten gain is certainly akin to the equitable 
notion of preventing unjust enrichment. Moreover, the widespread use of 
traditional legal institutions for untraditional purposes in antitrust enforce­
ment73 suggests a willingness on the part of courts and the bar to treat anti­
trust enforcement as a special case. Indeed, many have suggested that wider 
use be made of equitable enforcement power in antitrust matters to restructure 
oligopoly markets and markets with a high concentration of economic power
63 Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 409-10 (1945) (footnotes 
omited).
110 See, e.g., United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173 (1944); 
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 91 F. Supp. 333, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
71 Mr. Justice Jackson spoke of the preventative element in International Salt Co. 
v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 400 (1947):
The short of the contention is that since the company never has threat­
ened to violate any decree entered in this case to restrain future use of the ille­
gal leases, it feels that the provision invalidating the objectionable leases 
should end the matter and that, as to any additional provisions, appellant is 
entitled to stand before the court in the same position as one who has never 
violated the law at all —  that the injunction should go no farther than die vio­
lation or threat of violation. We cannot agree that the consequences of proved 
violations are so limited.. . .  When the purpose to restrain trade appears from 
a clear violation of law, it is not necessary that all of the untraveled roads to 
that end be left open and that only the worn one be closed. The usual ways to 
the prohibited goal may be blocked against the proven transgressor and the
burden put upon him to bring any proper claims for relief to the court’s 
attention.
See also United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 340 U.S. 76 (1950), in which the 
Supreme Court modified a lower court decree so as to cover restraints of trade in all 
types of gypsum products and extended coverage of the decree to all sections of the 
country, even though the complaint only covered restraints of trade in the gypsum board 
market and was limited to the Eastern United States.
” iSee, e.g., United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948); 
United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944); United States v. 
Western Elec. Co., 1956 Trade Cas. If 68,246 (D.N.J.) (consent decree). The famous 
“Mother Hubbard Case,”  noted in Antitrust Subcomm. of the Judiciary Comm., 
Report on Consent Degree Program of the Dep’t of Justice, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 
170-77 (1959) (report pursuant to H. Res. 27), was an action designed to eliminate 
restraints of trade in the petroleum industry in which the Court attempted extensive 
regulation of refining and pipelines. For subsequent litigation see United States v. Atlan­
tic Ref. Co., 360 U.S. 19 (1959). See Hearing Before Antitrust Subcommittee No. 5, 
Committee on the Judiciary, H.R., 85th Cong., 2d Sess., part II, vols. 1-3 (1958) (A. T. 
& T. and Western Electric). For an excellent analysis of affirmative government regula­
tion of the motion picture industry, see Note, An Experiment in Peventive Anti-Trust: 
Judicial Regulation of the Motion Picture Exhibition Market Under the Paramount De­
crees, 74 YaleL.J. 1041 (1965).
”  For example, the widespread use of consent decrees and nolo contendere pleas 
seems to be a pragmatic effort to shelter what is essentially an administrative form of 
enforcement in a judicial setting, with little of the protections and values of either ad­
ministrative law or judicial procedure.
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incompatible with a high level of competition,74 workable or otherwise. The 
theory by which the equitable powers of courts in antitrust matters could be 
directed to these ends certainly exists, but judicial reluctance to assume such a 
complex and difficult task acts as a deterrent. While not passing upon the 
merits of the substantive arguments in favor of and against “trust busting51 or 
the minimization of existing corporate giants as a fundamental goal of antitrust 
policy, the expansion of the equity power of courts to this end may well reveal 
that judges too are human and that the judicial process is only capable of so 
much.75 If wholesale restructuring of markets or industries is desired, consider­
able thought must be given to the institution that will implement such a policy. 
The courts have indicated a distinct reluctance to do so and the Federal Trade 
Commission as presently understaffed and underfinanced may well be inca­
pable of accomplishing such a goal.76
An additional and perhaps underrated feature of antitrust injunctive pow­
er is the permanency of the relief granted77 and the necessity for surveillance 
and enforcement of a decree. Theoretically, injunctions issued in antitrust 
cases are subject to modification,78 and on occasion have been modified.79 In
T*iSee, e.g., M . G oldberg , T h e  C o n s e n t  D e c r e e : I t s  Fo r m u l a tio n  an d  U se  
(1962); G. H a l e  & R. H ale , M a r k e t  Po w e r  —  Size  an d  Sh a p e  U nder  t h e  Sh e r ­
m a n  A ct  (1958) ;  C . K a y s e n  & D . T u r n e r , A n t it r u s t  Po l ic y : A n  E co n o m ic  and  
L egal  A n a l y s is  (1959); G. Sto c k in g  & M . W a t k in s , C a r te ls  in  A ctio n  (1946); 
Adam s, Dissolution, Divorcement, Divestiture: The Pyrrhic Victories of Antitrust, 27 
I n d . L J .  1 (1951).
18 The courts are well aware of their own limitations. In United States v. Para­
mount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948), Mr. Justice Douglas observed that although 
“equity has the power to uproot all parts of an illegal scheme —  the valid as well as the 
invalid —  in order to rid the trade or commerce of all taint of the conspiracy,” id. at 148, 
“competitive bidding involves the judiciary so deeply in the daily operation of this 
nation-wide business and promises such dubious benefits that it should not be under­
taken.”  Id. at 162. Mr. Justice Douglas went on to observe that:
It would involve the judiciary in the administration of intricate and detailed 
rules governing priority, period of clearance, length of run, competitive areas, 
reasonable return, and the like. The system would be apt to require as close 
a supervision as a continuous receivership, unless the defendants were to be 
entrusted with vast discretion. The judiciary is unsuited to affairs of business 
management; and control through the power of contempt is crude and clumsy 
and lacking in the flexibility necessary to make continuous and detailed super­
vision effective.
Id. at 163. . . . .
w There is a serious need for revitalizing the F.T.C. and defining its role in relation 
to the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice. In particular, the role of the 
F.T.G. as an expert commission concerned with broad trends in business structure and 
behavior needs to be emphasized. For an excellent discussion of the role of the commis­
sion, the Antitrust Division, and the inter-relationship of these agencies in overall anti­
trust enforcement see Elman, Antitrust Enforcement: Retrospect and Prospect, 53 
A.B.A.J, 609 (1967).
71 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 19 F. Supp. 374 (W.D. Pa. 1937).
78 The standard “boiler plate”  provision inserted at the end of each decree, litigated 
or by consent, usually reads as follows:
Jurisdiction of this cause,' and of the parties hereto, is retained by the 
Court for the purpose of enabling any of the parties to this degree, or any 
other person, firm or corporation  ^that may hereafter become bound thereby 
in whole or in part, to apply to this Court at any time for such orders, modifi­
cations, vacations or directions as may be necessary or appropriate (1) for 
the construction or carrying out of this decree, and (2) for the enforcement 
of compliance therewith.
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 340 U.S. 76, 105 (1950) (appendix to 
opinion of the Court).
70 United States v. Continental Can Co., 128 F. Supp. 932 (N.D. Cal. 1955); cf. 
Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 335 U.S. 303 (1948).
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practice, however, injunctive decrees —  litigated or by consent —  are seldom 
modified80 either at the instance of the defendants81 or of the government.82 
Judicial opposition to granting modification of injunctive relief seems especial­
ly pronounced when the original judgment is entered on a consent decree, 
since defendants submit to the decree “with their eyes open”83 or they have 
“enjoyed or speculated upon [the consent decree’s]. . .  favorable consequences 
or possibilities by avoiding the litigation and the hazards of a less favorable 
outcome.”84 In either case, the fact that the defendants would be better off if 
the injunction were relaxed is not sufficient; “[n]othing less than a clear show­
ing of grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen conditions”85 will justify 
the modification of an injunctive decree.
A too-trenchant attitude toward injunctive decree modification may well 
be self-defeating. The in terrorem effect of treble damage suits may be out­
weighed by the realization that an antitrust injunctive decree obtained by con­
sent, for all practical purposes, will not be modified under practically any con­
ditions. A defendant’s willingness to litigate rather than capitulate by consent 
may be expected to increase in direct proportion to judicial inflexibility on 
modification.
A  different type of modification, however, may stimulate a desire on the 
part of defendants and the government to capitulate rather than to litigate. 
The Supreme Court has not been reluctant to modify injunctions issued by 
lower courts86 and in some instances the Court has rewritten the entire decree.87 
When injunctive relief is inconsistent with existing law, inadequate for pur­
poses of restoring competition or preventing future violations, or based upon 
erroneous conclusions of fact or law, the Court will step in and modify the 
decree entered below.88 Since there is no jury trial and the lower court must
80 Perhaps the best indication of judicial reluctance to modify injunctive decrees 
may be gathered from a reading of United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106 (1932).
81 Id . : see United States v. Lucky Lager Brewing Co., 209 F. Supp. 665 (D. Utah 
1962).
88 Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 335 U.S. 303 (1948); United States v. Alumi­
num Co. of America, 153 F. Supp. 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); United States v. United Shoe 
Mach. Corp., 5 T r a d e  R e g . R e p . (1967 Trade Cas.) 72,070 (D. Mass.).
“ United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 115 (1932). See generally Note, 
Flexibility and Finality in Antitrust Consent Decrees, 80 H arv . L. R ev . 1303 (1967).
M United States v. Lucky Lager Brewing Co., 209 F. Supp. 665, 668 (D. Utah
1962).
“ United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932); see United States v. 
Savannah Cotton & Naval Stores Exch., Inc., 192 F. Supp. 256 (S.D. Ga. 1960), afi’d 
per curiam sub nom., Turpentine & Rosin Factors, Inc. v. United States, 365 U.S. 298 
(1961); United States v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 178 F. Supp. 325 (N.D. 
Ohio 1959).
m See Note, Modification of Litigated Antitrust Decrees by the Supreme Court, 56 
Colum. L. Rev. 420 (1956).
81 See, e.g., Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945); United 
States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173 (1944).
83 Note, supra note 86, at 425. In United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 
366 U.S. 316, 323 (1961), Justice Brennan stated:
In sum, we assign to the District Courts the responsibility initially to
fashion the remedy, but recognize that while we accord due regard and respect 
to the conclusion of the District Court, we have a duty ourselves to be sure 
that a decree is fashioned which will effectively redress proved violations of 
the antitrust laws. The proper disposition of antitrust cases is obviously of
great public importance, and their remedial phase, more often than not, is
crucial. For the suit has been a futile exercise if the Government proves a
violation but fails to secure a remedy adequate to redress it.
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make findings of fact and conclusions of law,89 Supreme Court review of the 
law and the facts (always prefaced by the remark that wide latitude is given the 
court below) may be quite extensive.00 Consequently, an unmeasured but very 
real weight on the scale of negotiations for both the government and the de­
fendant is the lurking omnipresence of what may happen if the case is appealed 
to the Supreme Court.
B. State Antitrust Cases
The paucity of state-prosecuted antitrust cases of recent vintage seriously 
hampers any meaningful evaluation of state injunctive decrees. Not only are 
many of the cases old,91 but many involve the enjoining of labor union activ­
ity92 and are of questionable validity today with the expansion of the preemp­
tion doctrine in the labor field during the past few decades.93
State antitrust equity jurisdiction has been used to enjoin mergers,94 pos­
sible tie-ins,95 group boycotts,96 price fixing,97 anticompetitive joint ventures,98 
cornering of markets,89 exclusive distributorship arrangements,100 monopoliza­
tion,101 bid rigging,102 the creation of trusts,103 the voting of stock in a trust,104 
and the allocation of customers;103 to dissolve trade associations found to have 
violated state antitrust prohibitions;106 and to forfeit the charter of corpora­
tions violating state antitrust laws.107 It seems clear, assuming state antitrust
69 Fed . R. Civ. P. 52(a).
80 See, e.g., cases cited note 87 supra.
“ iSee, e.g., Louisville & N.R.R. v. Kentucky, 161 U.S. 677 (1896); State ex rel. 
Attorney Gen. v. Kansas City Live Stock Exch., 211 Mo. 181, 109 S.W. 675 (1908) ;  
State v. Adams Lumber Co., 81 Neb. 392, 116 N.W. 302 (1908).
See, e.g., Denver Jobbers’ Ass’n v. People ex rel. Dickson, 21 Colo. App. 326, 122 
P. 404 (1912); Hunt v. Riverside Co-op. Club, 140 Mich, 538, 104 N.W. 40 (1905); 
People v. MasieUo, 177 Misc. 608, 31 N.Y.S.2d 512 (Sup. Ct. 1941), aff’d, 271 App. 
Div. 875, 66 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1946); People v. Smoked Fish Workers Local 20377, 169 
Misc. 255, 7 N.Y.S.2d 185 (Sup. Ct. 1938); Ridge Mfg. Co. v. United Electrical Work­
ers Local 735, 36 Ohio Op. 206, 77 N.E.2d 248 (G.P. Cuyahoga County 1947).
03 Several Supreme Court preemption decisions in the labor law field have involved 
state injunctions against union activity based upon restraint of trade theories. See, e.g., 
Teamsters Local 24 v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959); Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 
348 U.S. 468 (1955). See generally J. F l y n n ,  F e d e r a l i s m  a n d  S t a t e  A n t i t r u s t  
R e g u l a t io n  128-35 (1964).
041See, e.g., Louisville & N.R.R. v. Kentucky, 161 U.S. 677 (1896).
w See Crescent Cotton Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 257 U.S. 129 (1921).
00 State v. Aikens, 83 Kan. 792,112 P. 605 (1911) (per curiam).
"State ex rel. Taylorv. Anderson, 350 Mo. 884, 254 S.W.2d 609 (1953).
03 Stockton v. Central R.R., 50 N.J. Eq. 52, 24 A. 964 (Ch. 1892) ;  Morrill v. Bos­
ton & M.R.R., 55 N.H. 531 (1875). .
w Columbus Packing Co. v. State ex rel. Schlesinger,-100 Ohio St. 285, 126 N.E. 
291 (1919). \
100 State v. Willys-Overland, Inc., 211 S.W. 609 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919).
101 Commonwealth v. McHugh, 326 Mass. 249, 93 N.E.2d 751 (1950).
152 People v. Building Maintenance Contractors’ Ass’n, Inc., 41 Cal. 2d 719, 264 
P.2d31 (1953). .
503 State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Standard Oil Co., 49 Ohio St. 137, 30 N.E. 279 
(1892).
101 Southern Elec. Sec. Co. v. State, 91 Miss. 195,44 So. 785 (1907).
105Hunt v. Riverside Co-op. Club, 140 Mich. 538, 104 N.W. 40 (1905).
IM See Grenada Lumber Co. v. Mississippi, 217 U.S. 433 (1910).
m State v. Retail Gasoline Dealers Ass’n, Inc., 256 Wis. 537, 41 N.W.2d 637
(1950).
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laws should be enforced, that a state antitrust statute should vest general equity 
power— both prohibitory and mandatory —  in state courts to prevent and 
restrain antitrust violations.108 Although dissolution of domestic corporations 
may be accomplished under state charter forfeiture provisions and, to a limited 
degree, a form of dissolution may be achieved by ouster of foreign corporations 
under state license forfeiture provisions, affirmative equitable relief in the form 
of dissolution, divestiture, or divorcement is difficult to achieve without a grant 
of full equity powers under state antitrust laws. Since equity jurisdiction pro­
vides the primary remedial devices used to remove anticompetitive restraints 
and to prevent future violations of antitrust prohibitions by proven violators, a 
clear-cut grant of general equity power is essential to a workable state antitrust 
statute.
I I I .  P r e l im in a r y  I n j u n c t iv e  R e l ie f  in  P u b l ic  E n f o r c e m e n t
A. Federal Enforcement
Section 4 of the Sherman Act109 and section 15 of the Clayton Act,110 which 
empower the Attorney General to seek equitable relief for violations of the 
antitrust laws, also authorize courts to “make such temporary restraining order 
or prohibition as shall be deemed just in the premises”111 pending a final deter­
mination of the case. Thus, the United States district courts are empowered to 
issue temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions at the instance 
of the Attorney General to aid in enforcing the antitrust laws.
The general facts and circumstances which will persuade a court to exer­
cise this discretionary power in antitrust cases have closely paralleled those in 
general equity practice. A  temporary restraining order, which seems to be 
seldom sought or granted, is only issued where the "mischief . . . [presents] 
serious, imminent, and irremediable” harm and time does not permit the giv­
ing of notice to the defendant.112 Many courts require that the government 
show a prima facie case of violation and irreparable harm before they will 
grant a preliminary injunction.113 Other courts have applied noticeably less 
stringent standards for preliminary injunctive relief, usually requiring that
m See generally State v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc., 1966 Trade Cas. 71,738 (Wis. 
CIr. Ct, Milwaukee County), Rev’d on other grounds, 31 Wis. 2d 699, 144 N.W.2d 1, 
cert, denied, 385 U.S. 990 (1966). The tentative draft of the Uniform State Antitrust 
Law (Legislative Research Center, University of Michigan Law School) vests general 
equity jurisdiction in state courts to issue mandatory and prohibitory injunctions and 
temporary restraining orders. The proposed Uniform Draft does not mention prelimin­
ary injunctions. Tentative Draft of Uniform State Antitrust Act § 14, 4 T r a d e  R e g . 
R e p . H30,101,at 35,155 (1965).
15 U.S.C. § 4 (1964).
1,015 U.S.C. § 25 (1964). Considerable dispute has arisen over the use of prelimi­
nary injunctive relief in the enforcement of § 7 of the Clayton Act. For an analysis see 
Note, Preliminary Injunctions and the Enforcement of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 40 
N.Y.U.L. R e v . 771 (1965).
11115 U.S.C. §§ 14, 25 (1964).
‘“ United States v. Coal Dealers’ Ass’n, 85 F. 252, 259 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1898).
113 See, e.g., United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963);
United States v. Penick & Ford, Ltd., 242 F. Supp. 518 (D.N.J. 1965); United States 
v. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 270 (W.D.N.Y. 1940). Contra, United
States v. Pennzoil Co., 252 F. Supp. 962 (W.D. Pa. 1965).
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“the balance of hardships tips decidedly toward the plaintiff”114 and that the 
plaintiff raise serious questions of law and fact on the merits of the ultimate 
issue.115 The existence of disputed issues of law or fact does not, in itself, bar 
preliminary relief, nor need the plaintiff show a right to final relief in order to 
obtain a preliminary injunction.116
Some courts, however, have held that the right to ultimate relief in the 
form of divestiture precludes the issuance of a temporary restraining order in 
merger cases.117 Conditioning preliminary relief upon possible ultimate relief 
seems to be done with little thought of the difficulty of unscrambling scrambled 
eggs118 or the damage which may be done to the merged company in the 
interim.119
A preliminary injunction may not be staved off by submitting an ex parte 
stipulation over the government’s objection, since such a maneuver would have 
all the effects of a preliminary injunction but would not be based on a hearing 
with finding of facts and law.120 The hearing is usually conducted on the basis 
of affidavits submitted by the parties. The government’s affidavits in support 
of the motion for preliminary injunction must indicate a reasonable probabil­
ity of success after full litigation; an affidavit by a government attorney or 
economist based on something less than expertise in the particular industry 
involved is not accorded much weight by some courts.121
The purpose of preliminary injunctive relief has often been stated to be the 
preservation of the status quo, the prevention of irreparable harm, or the pro­
tection of the court’s jurisdiction. But the preliminary injunction may not 
be used in place of other traditional remedies. For example, in De Beers Con­
solidated Mines, Ltd. v. United States*— the Supreme Court struck down the 
use of the preliminary injunction as- a substitute for a writ of attachment. De 
Beers was charged with monopolization and restraint of trade in the gem and
“ Hamilton Watch Go. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738, 740 (2d Cir. 1953).
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 247 F. Supp. 308 (E.D. Mo. 1962), 
aff’d, 382 U.S. 12 (1965).
n°Id. '
117 See, e.g., United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 1960 Trade Cas. 69,698 (S.D. 
Gal.); see United States v. Continental Can Co., 1956 Trade Gas. 68,479 (S.D.N.Y.).
118 A United States district court judge for the District of Utah had to clear his 
docket for five months to handle the divestiture ordered by the Supreme Court in United 
States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964). The divestiture did not re­
establish a company of the same competetive strength as existed before the merger. See 
N.Y. Times, § 3, at 1, col. 1 (May 23, 1965); N.Y. Times, at 65, col. 5 (May 25,
1965). The Supreme Court reversed the lower court decree at the instance of inter- 
venors for failure of the lower court to fulfill the Supreme Court’s original mandate. 
Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129 (1967). The 
parties are presently engaged in the complicated task of attempting to restore to its 
original competitive strength and independence a company that was merged several 
years ago.
Loss of plants, business opportunities, skilled personnel, goodwill, and established 
business relationships are some of the types of irreparable harm which may occur to the 
corporation submerged by a merger unless strong preliminary injunctive relief is granted. 
See United States v. Aluminium Ltd., 1965 Trade Cas. If 71,366 (D.N.J.): United States 
v. Chrysler Corp., 232 F. Supp. 651 (D.N.J. 1964).
iy> United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 71 F. Supp. 734 (D. Del. 1947).
See, e.g., United States v. GimbelBros., Inc., 202 F. Supp. 779 (E.D. Wis. 1962) ;  
United States v. Brown Shoe Co., 1956 Trade Cas. If 68,244 (E,D. Mo.).
1X1325 U.S. 212 (1945).
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industrial diamond industry; the district court, on the theory of securing the 
performance of any future orders the court might make, issued a preliminary 
injunction to enjoin the transfer of bank accounts held by the defendant for­
eign corporations in United States banks.123 The Supreme Court held that the 
federal courts have jurisdiction “to restrain action or conduct violative of the 
statute” in the “same character as that which may be granted finally,” con­
cerning matters related to the lawsuit. But using the preliminary injunction 
“as a method of providing security for compliance with other process which 
conceivably may be issued for satisfaction of a money judgment for contempt” 
was held to be beyond the equity jurisdiction of a court.124
In addition to requiring a reasonable probability of success upon a full 
hearing, a court must also weigh the relative injury to the parties,125 except per­
haps in merger cases under section 7 of the Clayton Act. In the latter case it 
has been suggested that the government need not show injury to the public 
in order to obtain preliminary or final injunctive relief.125
Merger cases under section 7 of the Clayton Act, the type of case in which 
preliminary injunctive relief is most commonly sought, illustrate well the bal- 
ancing-of-hardships process that a court must engage in when formulating a 
preliminary injunction.127 On the defendant’s side of the case the courts usual­
ly weigh the effects of restricting an individual’s property rights in the stock 
or assets acquired; the loss of time and the expense already invested in the 
planning and execution of the merger; the loss caused by timing the merger 
to meet certain stock market conditions; whatever competitive advantages may 
reside in the merger; the fact that the government is not required to post an 
indemnity bond; and the general factor that the defendant’s freedom of action 
is being restrained without a full hearing on the merits.128 On the government’s
^United States v. De Beers Consol. Mines, Ltd., 1945 Trade Cas. fl 57,354 
(S.D.N.Y.), rev’d, 325 U.S. 212 (1945).
121 De Beers Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 220 (1945).
125 See Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953); 
United States v. Aluminum Go. of America, 247 F. Supp. 308 (E.D. Mo. 1962), aff’d, 
382 U.S. 12 (1965).
In United States v. Brown Shoe Co., 1956 Trade Cas. If 68,244 (E.D. Mo.), the 
court stated:
One exception to the rule is that in a case . . . where the Government is 
party plaintiff, if by acquiring stock by one corporation in another corpora­
tion, in any line of interstate commerce, in any section of the country, the 
effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition or tend 
to create a monopoly, plaintiff would not have to show hardship to any seg­
ment of the public. It is patent on the face of Section 7 that its purpose is to 
bar mergers which tend to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly 
before they ripen into actuality. Consequently hardship . . .  is not and cannot 
be a part of the Government’s burden.
Id. at 71,114 (footnote omitted).
127 Preliminary injunctions have also been used to preserve and protect a court’s 
jurisdiction over a case before it. See, e.g., United States v. Western Pa. Sand & Gravel 
Ass’n, 114 F. Supp. 158 (W.D. Pa. 1953) (preliminary injunction subject to a show 
cause order for contempt of consent decree). But see De Beers Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. 
United States, 325 U.S. 212 (1945) ;  United States v. Wallace & Tieman Co., 1954 
Trade Cas. ft 67,659 (D.R.I. 1953) (court refused relief on the grounds that dissolution 
had occurred in fact).
123 See generally United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 1966 Trade Cas. If 71,872
(S.D. Cal.); United States v. FMC Corp., 218 F. Supp. 817 (N.D. Gal.), appeal dis­
missed, 321 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1963). The courts may also be concerned with the ad­
verse effect of a preliminary injunction upon third parties. See United States v. West Va. 
Pulp & Paper Co., 1965 Trade Cas. If 71,452 (S.D.N.Y.).
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side are weighed the anticompetitive effects of the merger; the obvious diffi­
culty of divestiture; and the debilitating effect of the merger upon the good 
will, business relationships, employee morale, and financial standing of the 
merged company.129
On occasion, the preliminary injunction has been used to do far more 
than merely protect the status quo. In United States v. Aluminum Co. of 
America?™ an action to enjoin a violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act by 
Alcoa’s acquisition of Cupples Products Corporation,131 the court issued a pre­
liminary injunction which (1) prohibited further consolidation; (2) required 
that the corporate names be kept separate and distinct; (3) required the cor­
porations to maintain separate pension plans and sale organizations; (4) pro­
hibited either corporation from hiring the employees of the other; (5) pro­
hibited Alcoa from selling or encumbering any of the Cupples stock; and (6) 
required Cupples, pending final determination of the case, to operate a fabri­
cation plant conceived by it, but built by Alcoa in Alcoa’s own name subse­
quent to the stock acquisition. While the preliminary injunction was designed 
to protect the merged company from destruction as a competitor, it also in­
sured that any future court order of divestituture could be carried out. As the 
Alcoa litigation shows, it is often necessary to go beyond preservation of the 
status quo in order to protect the merged company from being drained of per­
sonnel, assets, and good will between the filing of the complaint and the ulti­
mate termination of the litigation.
The initial stages of the Brown Shoe merger case132 illustrate how a care­
fully drawn preliminary injunctive decree can obtain these objectives while 
mitigating damage to the defendants. Upon motion for a preliminary injunc­
tion, the district court struck a balance between allowing consummation of the 
merger and postponing it indefinitely.133 On the one hand, the court was faced 
with the prospect of being unable to unravel the merger if a violation were 
found, while on the other, account had to be taken of important business con­
siderations —  particularly stock market conditions— which would make delay 
of the merger damaging to the defendant if it were enjoined by preliminary 
injunction and a finding of no violation were later made. The court resolved 
its Solomon’s choice by permitting consummation of the merger in form and 
on paper, but not in substance. This was accomplished by dissolving a tem­
^  See generally United States v. Standard Oil Co. (N.J.), 1965 Trade Cas. IT 
71,503 (D.N.J.); United States v. Chrysler Corp., 232 F. Supp. 651 (D.N.J. 1964). 
These factors have also had substantial effect in influencing federal courts to issue pre­
liminary injunctions at the instance of private litigants. See Vanadium Corp. of America 
v. Susquehanna Corp., 203 F. Supp. 686 (D. Del. 1962). Another factor often stressed 
in granting motions for preliminary injunctions in private cases is the prevention of the 
destruction of the moving party’s business. See, e.g., Bergen Drug Co. v. Parke, Davis & 
Co., 307 F.2d 725 (3d Cir. 1962) ;  McKesson & Robbins, Inc. v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 
235 F. Supp. 743 (E.D. Pa. 1964). But see House of Materials, Inc. v. Simplicity Pat­
tern Co., 298 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1962), rev’g P.W. Husserl, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern 
Co., 191 F. Supp. 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
*  247 F. Supp. 308 (E.D. Mo. 1962), aff’d, 382 U.S. 12 (1965).
131 The acquisition, a move by Alcoa to intergrate forward into the aluminum fab­
rication of doors and windows, was subsequently found to violate § 7 of the Clayton Act. 
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 1964 Trade Cas. 71,243 (E.D. Mo.).
131 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
1SS1956 Trade Cas. 68,244 (E.D. Mo.).
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porary restraining order against a planned merger vote by the stockholders of 
Brown and Kinney and by issuing a preliminary injunction requiring that 
(1) Kinney assets be vested in a Brown subsidiary; (2) the subsidiary have in­
dependence and no directors in common with Brown; (3) Kinney’s after­
merger acquired assets and profits be kept separate and be retained by Kinney; 
(4) Brown retain the Kinney stock and not encumber it; (5) all of Kinney’s 
leases on retail shoe outlets be renewed in Kinney’s name; (6) none of Kin­
ney’s retail outlets in competition with those of Brown outlets be closed; (7) 
none of Kinney’s factories be taken over by Brown; and, (8) upon formation 
of the Kinney subsidiary by Brown, the subsidiary submit to the court’s juris­
diction.
Thus, in the Alcoa and Brown Shoe cases, the courts not only balanced the 
equities in determining whether a preliminary injunction should issue, but also 
designed the injunction itself so as to minimize imbalance. These cases also 
illustrate the necessity for preliminary injunctive relief not only to preserve 
the status quo but to establish conditions which will facilitate any ultimate or­
ders necessary after full litigation and to insure that the sum of the parts 
subsequent to divestiture equals the sum of the competitive parts prior to 
merger.134
B. State Enforcement
A  few state antitrust statutes expressly authorize preliminary injunctive 
relief at the request of state officials135 and the breadth of the grant of equity 
jurisdiction in the antitrust laws of other states seems broad enough to include 
the power to issue preliminary injunctions.136 The general failure of state 
officials to enforce state antitrust laws has resulted, of course, in judicial de­
velopment of the standards to be applied when public officials request pre­
liminary injunctive relief. In the few state court cases in which preliminary 
injunctive relief has been sought, it has usually been in the form of a request 
for the appointment of a receiver pending quo warranto or ouster proceed­
ings137 or the seeking of an injunction against labor union activity threatening 
immediate or irreparable harm138
134 The court may be required to oversee defendant compliance with the preliminary 
injunction, since business considerations may dictate that substantial action be taken with 
regard to the assets of the merged firm. See United States v. Aluminium Ltd., 1966 
Trade Gas. fl 71, 867 (D.N.J.).
123 See C o lo . R e v . St a t . A n n . § 55-4-5 (1963); Id a h o  C ode A n n . § 48-112
(1947); L a . R ev . St a t . A n n . § 13:5088 (1951); M in n . St a t . A n n . § 325.81(2)
(1966); M o . A n n . St a t . § 416.260(2) (1952); N e b . R ev . St a t . § 59-819 (1960); 
N.D. C e n t . C ode § 51-08-11 (1960); O h io  R ev . C ode A n n . § 1331.11 (Page 1962);
O k l a . St a t . A n n . tit. 79, § 22 (1965); Wrs. St a t . A n n . § 133-02 (1957), as amended, 
Supp. (1967).
123 See, e.g., C a l . B u s . & Pr o f . C ode § 16754.5 (West 1964); H a w a ii R ev . L a w s
§ 205A-13 (Supp. 1965); M a s s . G e n . L a w s  A n n . ch. 93, § 3 (1954); N.Y. G e n . B u s . 
L a w  § 342 (McKinney 1957); S.D, C ode § 13.1808 (1939); W a s h . R ev . C ode A n n .
§ 19.86.080 (Supp. 1966). It has been held that temporary or preliminary injunctive 
relief is not available under the Mississippi antitrust laws. Harvey v. State ex rel. Knox,
149 Miss. 874, 116 So. 98 (1928).
131 See, e.g., State v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 138 La. 1005, 71 So. 137, 139
(1916); State ex rel. Hamilton v. Standard Oil Co., 176 Wash. 251, 28 P.2d 790 
(1934).
123 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. McHugh, 326 Mass. 249, 93 N.E.2d 751 (1950); 
State v. Milk Handler’s & Processors Ass’n, Inc., 5 T rade R eo . R e p . (1967 Trade Cas.) 
fl 71,969 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 6, 1967).
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The standards applied seem generally to follow those established for the 
granting of preliminary injunctive relief in federal antitrust cases: (1) the 
grant or denial of preliminary relief is largely in the discretion of the trial 
court; (2) preliminary relief is not readily granted and when it is granted it is 
usually done to maintain the “status quo” or to prevent immediate or irrepar­
able harm; (3) the state must make out a prima facie case of violation or show 
a reasonable probability of success upon full litigation; and, (4) the court will 
balance the relative hardships to the parties in deciding whether preliminary 
injunctive relief should issue.139
The need for including preliminary injunctive relief in state antitrust laws 
is difficult to illustrate absent concrete evidence of the types of cases state offi­
cials may be expected to encounter. However, federal experience with essen­
tially local restraints of trade140 seems to indicate that state courts handling 
local restraints of trade will need such power and that the judiciary may be 
expected to proceed with caution where preliminary equitable relief is sought. 
Although preliminary injunctive relief seems to be used most often in merger 
cases —  which state antitrust enforcement may not often encounter141 —  it 
seems reasonable to insure that the weapon is available to prevent immediate 
and irreparable harm, to maintain the status quo, or to insure that any final 
order the court may make will not be frustrated by events occurring while the 
litigation is pending.
I V .  P r iv a t e  E n f o r c e m e n t  a n d  I n j u n c t iv e  R e l ie f
A. Permanent Injunctive Relief
Section 16 of the Clayton Act authorizes t([a]ny person, firm, corporation, 
or association . . .  to sue for and have injunctive relief . . .  against threatened 
loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws. . .  when and under the same 
conditions and principles as injunctive relief against threatened conduct that 
will cause loss or damage is granted by courts of equity.5’142 Prior to the pas­
sage of the Clayton Act, no private injunctive relief under the Sherman Act 
was available to persons injured by Sherman Act violations.143
See cases cited notes 136-37 supra', State v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc., 1966 Trade 
Gas. 71,738 (Wis. Cir. Ct, Milwaukee County), red’d, on other grounds, 31 Wis. 2d 
699,144N.W.2d 1, cert, denied, 385 U.S. 990 (1966).
1401See generally J. F l .y n n ,  F e d e r a l i s m  a n d  S t a t e  A n t i t r u s t  R e g u l a t io n  254­
312 (1964) ;  Kallis, Local Conduct and the Sherman Act, 1959 D u k e  L.J. 236.
See generally J. F l y n n ,  supra note 140, at 201—52. There have been cases under 
state antitrust laws where mergers have been attacked. See, e.g., Peoples Sav. Bank v. 
Stoddard, 359 Mich. 297, 102 N.W.2d 777 (1960). The tentative draft of a proposed 
Uniform State Antitrust Law does not include a section comparable to § 7 of the Clayton 
Act See Tentative Draft of Proposed Uniform State Antitrust Act, 4 T r a d e  R e g . R e p . 
fl 30,101 (1965).
1U 15 U.S.C. §26 (1964).
lU Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal, 244 U.S. 459, 471 (1917). In De Koven v. Lake 
Shore & M.S. Ry., 216 F. 955, 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1914), however, the court upheld the 
right of a minority shareholder to bring an action in equity for Sherman Act violations on 
the theory that a stockholder’s derivative suit to enjoin ultra vires acts by a corporation 
exists independent of the Sherman Act. In a subsequent phase of this litigation, Con­
tinental Sec. Co. v. Michigan Cent R.R., 16 F.2d 378, 379 (6th Cir. 1926), cert, denied, 
274 U.S. 741 (1927), the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that § 16 of the Clayton 
Act did not authorize affirmative equitable relief in the form of dissolution. See generally 
Note, Availability of Divestiture in Private Litigation as a Remedy for Violation of Sec­
tion 7 of the Clayton Act, 49 M i n n . L. R e v . 267 (1964).
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The right to private injunctive relief under section 16 of the Clayton Act 
is phrased in slightly different language than the right to public injunctive re­
lief granted by section 4 of the Sherman Act144 and section 15 of the Clayton 
Act.145 In section 15 the United States is granted the power to “institute pro­
ceedings in equity to prevent and restrain . . .  violations. . . .  by way of [a] peti­
tion setting forth the case and praying that such violation shall be enjoined or 
otherwise prohibited.”146 A  private person is “entitled to sue for . . .  injunctive 
relief . . .  against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws 
. . . when and under the same conditions and principles as injunctive relief 
against threatened conduct that will cause loss or damage is granted by courts 
of equity . . . under the rules governing such proceedings.”147 The statutory 
right of private injunctive relief is phased in prospective terms; it is to be used 
to protect private plaintiffs against future conduct threatening them with loss 
or damage. The statutory language seems to indicate that Congress intended 
to limit private injunctive relief to the correction of conditions which pose 
future dangers for the particular private plaintiff rather than to empower pri­
vate litigants to correct public wrongs. This interpretation of section 16 of the 
Clayton Act has led some courts to hold that private injunctive relief is not 
as broad in scope as public injunctive relief since the Act only authorizes nega­
tive and not affirmative injunctive relief.148 It has been convincingly argued149 
that this interpretation of section 16 of the Clayton Act is erroneous, particular­
ly since the right of the federal government to affirmative injunctive relief un­
der the negative language of section 4 of the Sherman Act and section 15 of 
the Clayton Act has long been recognized.150
Only a few state antitrust laws expressly authorize private injunctive re­
lief,161 although many state courts have granted equitable relief for state anti­
trust law violations at the instance of private suitors152 because of the inade­
14415 U.S.G. § 4 (1964).
145 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1964).
,M Id.
141 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1964).
148 See, e.g., Fein v. Security Banknote Co., 157 F. Supp. 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); 
Westor Theatres, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 757, 763 (D.N.J.
1941).
149 Note, supra note 143, at 277-81.
3“ See, e.g., Standard Oil G o . v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). The Court 
observed that the purpose of the equity remedy in antitrust cases is “ [t]o forbid the doing 
in the future of acts like those which . . . have been done in the past which would be 
violative of the statute . . . and thus neutralize the extension and continually operating 
force which the possession of the power unlawfully obtained has brought and will con­
tinue to bring about.”  Id. at 78. The most common types of affirmative injunctive relief 
requested are dissolution and divestiture. For excellent studies of these remedies see 
Duke, Scope of Relief Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 63 C o l u m . L. R e v . 1192 
(1963); Van Cise, Limitations Upon Divestiture, 19 G e o . W a s h . L. R e v . 147 (1950); 
Comment, Aspects of Divestiture as an Antitrust Remedy, 32 F o r d h a m  L. R e v . 135 
(1963).
111 H a w a i i  R e v . L a w s ,  § 205A-11 (1) (b) (S u p p .  1965); L a . R e v . S t a t . A n n . 
§ 51:129 (1965); V a . C o d e  A n n . § 59-32 (1950); W a s h . R e v . C o d e  A n n . § 19.86.090 
(1961).
“ * See cases cited note 17 supra.
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quacy of the remedy at law /53 irreparable harm,154 multiplicity of lawsuits,155 
unascertainable damages,156 or because a malicious interference with contrac­
tual or property rights was threatened.157 Apart from serving as a defense in 
debt and contract cases, state antitrust statutes seem to have been most widely 
used by private parties seeking injunctive relief against conduct violative of 
state antitrust policy.
At the federal level the standard to be applied in determining whether 
injunctive relief is warranted generally includes three elements. The plaintiff 
must (1) prove a violation of the antitrust laws (2) injuring the public (3) 
which results in special injury to the plaintiff.158 The crucial problems for 
private litigants are, of course, proving the antitrust violation and demonstrat­
ing how the conduct threatens loss or damage to the plaintiff. The task of 
proving a violation is usually a major difficulty because the cost and complexi­
ties normally attendant to litigating most antitrust cases are particularly oner­
ous for the inexperienced private litigant with limited resources. The problem 
of demonstrating special injury to the particular plaintiff by the antitrust vio­
lation is crucial because the "statute does not vest in a private litigant the right 
to redress a public wrong,”159 and the proof of a nexus between an antitrust 
violation which injures the public and injury to a particular plaintiff is a 
difficult evidentiary hurdle.160 It has been held, however, that when a plaintiff
See, e.g., TaUassee Oil & Fertilizer Co. v. Holloway, 200 Ala. 492, 76 So. 434 
(1917); Schwartz v. Laundry & Linen Supply Drivers Local 187, 339 Pa. 353, 14 A.2d 
438,440 (1940) (Pennsylvania has no general antitrust law).
^ S ee, e.g., Burke Transit Co. v. Queen City Coach Co., 228 N.C. 768, 47 S.E.2d 
297, 300 (1948); Group Health Co-op. v. King County Medical Soc’y, 39 Wash. 2d 
586,237 P.2d 737 (1951).
^  See, e.g., Kold Kist, Inc. v. Meat Cutters Local 421, 99 Gal. App. 191, 221 
P.2d 724 (1950); Schwartz v. Laundry & Linen Supply Drivers Local 187, 339 Pa. 353, 
14 A.2d 438 (1940).
^S ee, e.g., Brown v. Jacobs Pharmacy Co., 115 Ga. 429, 41 S.E. 553 (1902).
157 See, e.g., Employing Printers’ Club v. Doctor Blosser Co., 122 Ga. 509, 50 S.E. 
353 (1905); Barr v. Essex Trades Council, 53 N.J. Eq. 101, 30 A. 881 (Ch. 1894).
158 Shotkin v. General Elec. Co., 171 F.2d 236 (10th Cir, 1948); Revere Camera 
Co. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 81 F. Supp. 325, 330-31 (N.D. 111. 1948).
15"Dollac Corp. v. Margon Corp., 164 F. Supp. 41, 65 (D.N.J. 1958), aff’d on other 
grounds, 275 F.2d 202 (3d Cir. 1960); accord, Revere Camera Co. v. Eastman Kodak 
Co,, 81 F. Supp. 325 (N.D. 111. 1948); see Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Baldwin-Mont- 
rose Chem. Co., 1966 Trade Cas. If 71,678, at 82,066 (S.D.N.Y.).
3W Compare Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 221 F. Supp. 488, 493 (S.D.N.Y.
1963), cert, denied, 379 U.S. 882 (1964), with Julius M. Ames Co. v. Bostitch, Inc., 240 
F. Supp. 521 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). Causation is also difficult to prove in treble damage 
cases. See generally Pollock, The “Injury”  and “ Causation"  Elements of a Treble­
Damage Antitrust Action, 57 Nw. U.L. R e v . 691 (1963); Comment, Proof Require­
ments in Anti-Trust Suits: The Obstacles to Treble Damage Recovery, 18 U. C h i . L. R e v
130 (1950). Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1964), assists private 
parties in proving violation and public parties in proving violation and public injury 
but does not affect the plaintiffs burden of proving special injury to himself. In private 
injunction cases there has been little reliance upon § 5 (a) of the Clayton Act, presumably 
because the government’s prior suit often includes the type of relief a private party would 
be able to receive. The public relief presumably results in effecting relief against future 
injury and damages for the would-be private litigant contemplating an action in equity. 
The continuing attempts by private parties to intervene in government cases, however, 
might indicate that many_individuals threatened with loss or damage in the future do not 
believe a government action in equity will rectify the violation and prevent future harm 
to them. The general hostility of the courts to intervention in government-prosecuted 
antitrust cases has resulted in an expansion of amicus briefs, which can have considerable
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shows a “dangerous probability” of injury to himself, injunctive relief under 
section 16 of the Clayton Act is available.161
Injury to the public is presumed in cases of per se violations even when the 
“victim is just one merchant whose business is so small that his destruction 
makes little difference to the economy.”162 Private injuries, however, without 
presumed or proven injury to the public, are not actionable.163 To state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted, “allegations adequate to show a violation 
and . . . that plaintiff was damaged thereby are all the law requires.”164
Although the courts have broadly interpreted the language “any person, 
firm, corporation, or association”165 and have been willing to give broad in­
junctive relief to private antitrust plaintiffs, 166 private injunctive relief has 
been limited by two tendencies in the judicial administration of the antitrust 
laws: first, “any person” has not been widely interpreted where a stockholder 
has sought injunctive relief for an antitrust violation injuring his corporation; 
second, the courts have been reluctant to grant affirmative injunctive relief 
because of the seemingly negative language of section 16 of the Clayton Act.
A shareholder’s derivative action167 has remedial potential in the areas of 
preventing corporate conduct which would invite grave antitrust risks and 
penalties,168 in coercing reluctant corporate management to recover treble 
damages or to obtain injunctive relief against threatened damage to the cor­
poration by others,169 and in recovering damages from officers and directors for
impact. See Note, An Experiment in Preventive Anti-Trust: Judicial Regulation of the 
Motion Picture Exhibition Market under the Paramount Decrees, 74 Y a l e  L.J. 1041
(1965). See also Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy, 72 
Y a l e  L.J. 694 (1963).
101 Bedford Gut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters’ Ass’n, 274 U.S. 37 (1927).
162 Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 213 (1959) (footnotes 
omitted).
363 See, e.g., Shotkin v. General Elec. Co., 171 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1948).
1H Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656, 660 
(1961).
ies See, e.g., Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 447 (1945) (a state may 
sue under the antitrust laws in its capacity as parens patriae or proprietor).
1681See, e.g., Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963) (injunction 
against Exchange action which denied plaintiff stock market wire service) ; Columbia 
Raver Packers. Ass’n, Inc. v. Hinton, 315 U.S. 143 (1942) (enjoining monopolization 
and price fixing in Washington, Oregon, and Alaska fish market); Duplex Printing Press 
Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921) (injunction against national secondary boycott); 
Bale v. Glasgow Tobacco Bd. of Trade, Inc., 339 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1964) (injunction 
against enforcement of trade association bylaw); Bigelow v. RICO Radio Pictures, Inc.,
162 F.2d 520 (7th Cir.), cert, denied, 332 U.S. 817 (1947) (regulation of first-run 
motion picture allocation among competing theatres); Christiansen v. Mechanical Con­
tractors Bid Depository, 230 F. Supp. 186 (D. Utah 1964), afi’d, 352 F.2d 817 (10th 
Cir. 1965), cert, denied, 384 U.S. 918 (1966) (enjoining bid rigging scheme).
m See generally Blake, The Shareholders’  Role in Antitrust Enforcement, 110 U. 
P a . L. R e v . 143 (1961); Comment, Federal Antitrust Law —-  Stockholder’ s Remedies 
for Corporate Injury Resulting from Antitrust Violations: Derivative Antitrust Suit and 
Fiduciary Duty Action, 59 M i c h  L. R e v . 904 (1961); Note, Stockholders’  Suits and 
the Sherman Act, 5 S t a n . L. R e v . 480 (1953).
163 See, e.g., Schechtman v. Wolfson, 244 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1957); Brill v. General 
Indus. Enterprises, Inc., 234 F.2d 465 (3d Cir. 1956); Ramsburg v. American Inv. Co., 
231 F.2d 333 (7th Cir. 1956); Gomberg v. Midvale Co., 157 F, Supp. 132 (E.D. Pa. 
1955).
163 See, e.g., United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261
(1917); Fleitmann v. Welsbach Street Lighting Co., 240 U.S. 27 (1916); Rogers v.
American Can Co., 187 F. Supp. 532 (D.N.J. I960), aff’d, 305 F.2d 297 (1962).
HeinOnline -- 1967 Utah L. Rev. 364 1967
J u ly ]  INJUNCTIVE RELIEF UNDER ANTITRUST LAWS 365
injury to the corporation because of damages, penalties, or other loss caused 
by management violations of the antitrust laws.170 The effectiveness of the 
sanction is especially appealing since the primary thrust of derivative actions 
is to hold management responsible for its actions or failure to act. The imposi­
tion of the difficulties and complexities of derivative actions'171 upon an already 
complicated type of litigation —  the antitrust suit —  however, has resulted in 
judicial reluctance to fulfill the potentialities of the shareholders’ derivative 
action as an effective remedy in antitrust enforcement.172 Judicial reaction to 
stockholder attempts to enforce the antitrust laws in derivative suits seems to 
indicate that the wedding of private antitrust litigation and stockholder deriva­
tive suits is not favored. For example, stockholder attempts to enforce the cor­
poration’s antitrust remedies long stumbled over two Supreme Court cases 
which built an effective barricade against such suits. In Fleitmann v. Welsbach 
Street Lighting Co.?73 the Court held, per Justice Holmes, that a derivative bill 
in equity for treble damages was not available to a stockholder who claimed 
that the defendant’s control was destroying the corporation in violation of the 
antitrust laws, since the equity bill would deny the defendant his constitutional 
right to jury trial.174 In United Copper Securities Co. v. Amalgamated Copper 
Co.,175 the Court held that a stockholder’s derivative suit is purely equitable. 
The rule of these cases has been described as “absurdly simple.” “A  stockhold­
er’s derivative suit cannot be brought at law, for it is an equitable action; it 
cannot be brought in equity because it would take away the right of jury 
trial.”176 These cases did not bar the right to equitable relief, however, and 
more modem cases have indicated that the procedural difficulties raised by 
the Fleitmann and United Copper Securities Company cases in treble dam­
age actions can be overcome by the flexibility of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.177
The role that stockholder derivative actions have in antitrust enforcement, 
however, still remains unclear. The need for managerial freedom to make 
decisions and act without fear of astronomical antitrust liability must be bal­
anced against the strong public policy favoring enforcement of the antitrust
170 See, e.g.. Clayton v. Farish, 191 Misc. 136, 73 N.Y.S.2d 727 (Sup. Ct. 1947) ; 
Simon v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 179 Misc. 202, 38 N.Y.S.2d 270, 273 (Sup. Ct.
1942), aff’d mem., 267 App.Div. 890,47N.Y.S.2d589 (1944).
171 The most common difficulty is the strike suit, which in turn has resulted in a 
careful hedging in of die standards for derivative actions to prevent abuses. See generally 
Ballantine, Abuses of Shareholder’s Derivative Suits: How Far Is Califomiafs New “ Se­
curity for Expenses”  Act Sound Regulation?, 37 C a l i f .  L .  R e v . 399 (1949).
175 For an excellent analysis of the interrelationship of derivative actions and private 
antitrust enforcement see Blake, supra note 167.
173 240 U.S. 27 (1916).
171 This difficulty, in part, may be overcome by severing the “legal” issues from the 
“equitable”  and holding a Jury tiial on the former. See Fanchon & Marco, Inc. v. 
Paramount Pictures, Inc., 202 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1953); Columbia River Packers Ass’n, 
Inc. v. Hinton, 34 F. Supp. 970 (D. Ore. 1939), red'd on other grounds, 117 F.2d 310
(9th Cir. 1941), red’d, 315 U.S. 143 (1942).
176 244 U.S. 261 (1917).
110 Note, Stockholders* Suits and the Sherman Act, 5 S t a n . L. R e v . 480, 485
(1953).
117 See, e.g., Fanchon & Marco, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 202 F.2d 731 (2d 
Cir. 1953). But see International Rys. v. United Fruit Co., 373 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 
1967).
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laws and the need to curb the general trend of managerial independence as 
ownership of large corporations tends to become more dispersed. Such a bal­
ancing process would seem to demand that stockholders be permitted and en­
couraged to bring suit in situations in which managerial activity amounts to 
intentional violations of antitrust policy injuring the corporaton, predatory 
conduct resulting in antitrust liability, and conduct which clearly violates anti­
trust policy or is a clear-cut case of managerial refusal to exercise corporate 
rights under the antitrust laws without a compensating factor of legitimate 
business gains to be expected from refraining. Otherwise, deference should be 
paid to the business judgment of management, lest competition become dulled 
by managerial timidity in the face of astronomical antitrust liability.
The second limitation upon private injunctive relief under section 16 of 
the Clayton Act, that only negative relief against future violations threatening 
loss or damage will be granted, is based upon the language of the section. As 
mentioned earlier, this limitation upon the scope of private injunctive relief 
seems unwarranted.178 With the judicial evolution of section 7 of the Clayton 
Act and increased emphasis upon the prevention of mergers which tend to 
lessen competition, private litigation to enforce section 7 may be expected to 
increase substantially.179 And, as the Supreme Court suggested in United 
States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours &  Co.,180 affirmative injunctive relief in 
the form of divestiture should “always be in the forefront of a court’s mind 
when a violation of § 7 has been found.53181 Consequently, plaintiffs in private 
suits for injunctive relief against violations of section 7 of the Clayton Act have 
sought divestiture as the ultimate relief for the alleged violation.182 When 
affirmative injunctive relief is necessary to protect a private plaintiff from 
future loss or damage from violation of the antitrust laws, courts should nor­
mally grant such relief at the instance of a private litigant.183
At the state level there have been several reported cases of private litigants 
seeking permanent injunctive relief for antitrust violations.184 Private injunc­
tive relief has been utilized to enjoin monopolization threatening the destruc­
tion of a plaintiff’s business;185 to enjoin concerted refusals to deal;186 to end
178 Note, supra note 143.
1W In Julius M. Ames Go. v. Bostitch, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 521 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), the 
court rejected a contention that private parties could not sue under § 7 because the in- 
cipiency test of § 7 precluded the possibility of harm to the private plaintiff.
366 U.S. 316 (1961).
181 Id. at 331.
123 See, e.g., Hamilton Watch Go. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 
1953); American Commercial Barge Line Co. v. Eastern Gas & Fuel Associates, 204 F. 
Supp. 451 (S.D. Ohio 1962). •
1831See Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953); 
Julius M. Ames Co. v. Bostitch, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 521,526 (SD.N.Y. 1965): cf. Peoples 
Sav. Bank v. Stoddard, 359 Mich. 297, 102 N.W.2d 777, 799 (1960).
1841See cases cited note 17 supra.
185 See, e.g., Dothan Oil Mill Go. v. Espy, 220 Ala. 605, 127 So. 178 (1930); 
Group Health Co-op. v. Kings County Medical Soc’yj 39 Wash. 2d 586, 237 P.2d 737 
(1952).
1831See, e.g., Alfred M. Lewis, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 542, 163 Cal. App. 2d 771,
330 P.2d 53 (1958); Brown v. Jacobs Pharmacy Co., 115 Ga. 429, 41 S.E. 553 (1902).
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tie-ins restraining trade;187 to terminate group boycotts;158 to enjoin stock and 
asset acquisitions restraining trade and damaging minority shareholders;188 to 
restrain price-fixing schemes damaging a plaintiff ;190 to enjoin misuse of a pat­
ent monopoly in violation of state antitrust laws;191 and to terminate secon­
dary boycotts.192 While many of the cases are relatively old, they reflect the 
same factors which necessitate private injunctive relief under the federal anti­
trust laws. Injunctive relief is used primarily when predatory practices threat­
en destruction of a plaintiff’s business193 and when stock acquisitions with the 
ultimate purpose of absorbing the company whose stock is being acquired 
threaten the independent existence of a stockholder’s or management’s cor­
poration.194 Many antitrust injunctions at the state level have also been sought 
to enjoin labor union activity allegedly threatening irreparable harm to the 
plaintiff.193
The standards for invoking the assistance of a court of equity in private 
cases under state antitrust laws seem to be substantially the same as those ap­
plied in private injunctive cases under the federal antitrust laws. The plaintiff 
must prove an antitrust violation injuring the public and show special injury
187 See, e.g., Blackmon v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 179 Ga. 343, 175 S.E. 798 (1934).
- 153 See, e.g., Pimie Simons & Go. v. Whitney, 144 Misc. 812* 259 N.Y.S. 193 (Sup. 
Gt. 1932); Schwartz v. Laundry & Linen Supply Drivers Local 187, 339 Pa. 353, 14 A. 
2d 438 (1950) (injunction issued on common law theory; Pennsylvania has no general 
antitrust law).
See, e.g., Dunbar v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 238 III. 456, 87 N.E. 521 (1909); 
Harding v. American Glucose Co., 182 111. 551, 55 N.E. 577 (1899), appeal dismissed, 
187 U.S. 651 (1902) ; cf. Peoples Sav. Bank v. Stoddard, 359 Mich. 297, 102 N.W.2d 
777 (1960).
“°iSee, e.g., Fort Wayne Cleaners & Dyers Ass’n, Inc. v. Price, 127 Ind. App. 13,
137 N.E.2d 738 (1956); Knight & Jillson Co. v. Miller, 172 Ind. 27, 87 N.E. 823
(1909).
131 See, e.g., Straight Side Basket Corp. v. Webster Basket Co., 4 F. Supp. 644 
(W.D.N.Y. 1933). See also Straus v. American Publishers’ Ass’n, 231 U.S. 222 (1913) 
(enjoining abuse of federal copyright laws in violation of the New York antitrust law).
103 See, e.g., Ridge Mfg. Co. v. Elec. Workers Local 735, 36 Ohio Op. 206, 77 
N.E.2d 248 (C.P. Cuyahoga County 1947); Turner v. Zanes, 206 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1947).
133 Compare Dothan Oil Mill Co. v. Espy, 220 Ala. 605, 127 So. 178 (1930), and 
Brown v. Jacobs Pharmacy Co., 115 Ga. 429, 41 S.E. 553 (1902), with Klor’s, Inc. v. 
Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
1M Compare Dunbar v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 238 111. 456, 87 N.E. 521 (1909), 
and Harding v. American Glucose Co., 182 111. 551, 55 N.E. 577 (1899), appeal dis­
missed, 187 U.S. 651 (1902), with Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 
738 (2d Cir. 1953), and American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co.,
143 F. Supp. 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). - . • ’
li>s See, e.g., Fed. : .Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co.* 336 U.S. 490 (1949); Cal.:.
Alfred M. Lewis, Inc. v.‘Teamsters Local 54 ,163'Cal. App. 2d 771,330 P.2d 53 (1958);
Idaho'. Robison v. Hotel Employees Local 782, 35 Ida. 418, 207 P. 132 (1922); Mass.:
Folsom v. Lewis, 208 Mass. 336, 94 N.E. 316 (1911); Minn.'. Campbell v. Motion Pic­
ture Mach. Operators Local 219, 151 Minn. 220, 186 N.W. 781 (1922); M o.; Adams
Dairy, Inc. v. Burke, 293 S.W.2d 281 (Mo. 1956), cert, denied, 352 U.S. 969 (1957);
N.J.: Barr v. Essex Trades Council, 53 N.J. Eq. 101, 30 A. 881 (Ch. 1894); N.Y.:
Falciglia v. Gallagher, 164 Misc. 838, 299 N.Y.S. 890 (Sup. Gt. 1937); Ohio: Ridge
Mfg. Co. v. Elec. Workers Local 735, 36 Ohio Op. 206, 77 N.E.2d 248 (C.P. Cuyahoga
County 1947); Pa.: Schwartz v. Laundry & Linen Supply Drivers Local 187, 339 Pa.
353, 14 A.2d 438 (1940); Texas: Turner v. Zanes, 206 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. Civ. App.
1947).
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to himself.198 The element of public injury does not seem to be required in 
many states where the state antitrust law does not expressly provide for in­
junctive relief, and the courts have upheld the right of private parties to seek 
injunctive relief on traditional equity grounds. When the plaintiff is able to 
demonstrate an inadequate remedy at law,197 irreparable harm,198 the impos­
sibility of ascertaining damages,159 or the multiplicity of lawsuits,200 state courts 
do not dwell on the necessity of showing public as well as private injury. In 
effect then, private injunctive relief to restrain antitrust violations is looked 
upon not as supplemental enforcement of public policy by private individuals 
given standing to sue because of their special injury, but as a private action in 
equity to restrain injurious conduct traditionally within the framework of 
equitable cognizance.201 Thus, when a private litigant may have difficulty 
proving injury to the public, one of the elements necessary to invoke private 
injunctive relief under section 16 of the Clayton Act, consideration should be 
given the possibility of bringing the case in a state court under general common 
law equity principles.
A  few state cases have dealt with the question of antitrust derivative actions 
by shareholders. For example, in Di Tomasso v. Loverro202 a New York court 
enjoined performance of a corporation’s contract in violation of the Donnelly 
Act203 and awarded damages against the directors at the instance of a minority 
stockholder. In Anderson v. Shawnee Compress Co.,20i at the instance of 
minority stockholders of Shawnee, the Oklahoma courts restrained the leasing 
of the assets of the Shawnee Compress Company to a corporation attempting 
to monopolize the cotton compressing business. In each of these cases there 
is little analysis of the derivative suit or of its interrelationship with the en­
forcement of state antitrust laws. Little judicial development of the problem 
seems to have taken place generally.205
See, e.g., Schwartz v. Laundry & Linen Supply Drivers Local 187, 339 Pa. 353, 
14 A.2d 438 (1940); Group Health Co-op. v. King County Medical Soc’y, 39 Wash. 
2d 586,237 P.2d 737 (1951).
101 See, e.g., Tallassee Oil & Fertilizer Co. v. Holloway, 200 Ala. 492, 76 So. 434
(1917) • Sultan v. Star Co., 106 Misc. 43 ,174N.Y.S.52 (Sup. Ct. 1919).
ISS See, e.g., Dothan Oil Mill Co. v. Espy, 220 Ala. 605,127 So. 178 (1930); Group 
Health Co-op. v. King County Medical Soc’y, 39 Wash. 2d 586, 237 P.2d 737 (1951).
See, e.g., Kold Kist, Inc. v. Meat Gutters Local 421, 99 Cal. App. 2d 191, 221 
P.2d 724 (1950); Brown v. Jacobs Pharmacy Co., 115 Ga. 429,41 S.E.553 (1902).
^ S ee, e.g., Blackmon v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 179 Ga. 343, 175 S.E. 798 (1934); 
Schwartz v. Laundry & Linen Supply Drivers Local 187, 339 Pa. 353, 14 A.2d 438
(1940).
501 For example, in some state cases involving antitrust violations, private injunctive 
relief has been granted upon the traditional theories of preventing malicious interference 
with contractual and property rights, see, e.g., Employing Printers’ Club v. Doctor Blos- 
ser Co., 122 Ga. 509, 50 S.E. 353 (1905); Barr v. Essex Trades Council, 53 N.J. Eq. 
101, 30 A. 881 (Ch. 1894), or preventing the dilution of a stockholder’s voting rights, 
Dunbar v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 238 111. 456,87 N.E. 521 (1909).
*“ 250 App. Div. 206, 293 N.Y.S. 912, aff’d per curiam, 276 N.Y. 551, 12 N.E.2d 
570 (1937).
N.Y. G e n . B u s . L a w  § 340 (McKinney 1957).
2,117 Okla. 231, 87 P. 315 (1906), afi’d, 209 U.S. 423 (1908).
205 See also Dunbar v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 238 111. 456, 87 N.E. 521 (1909) ;  
Harding v. American Glucose Co., 182 111. 551, 55 N.E. 577 (1899), appeal dismissed, 
187 U.S. 651 (1902).
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The stockholder’s derivative suit may, of course, be brought under federal 
or state antitrust laws because of a breach of a fiduciary duty by corporate 
management evidenced by a corporate violation of state or federal antitrust 
laws or a refusal by management to enforce rights granted by such laws.208 In 
the latter case, the suit is not brought in equity under the antitrust laws but is a 
suit by a “dissenting minority stockholder to restrain the majority stockholders 
from accomplishing what is asserted to be an illegal or ultra vires act.”207 To 
establish this type of derivative action the plaintiff must prove that the anti­
trust statute was violated, that the directors knew or should have known their 
acts were illegal, and that the corporation was injured by the violation.203 This 
type of derivative action is not governed by statutory provisions in state and 
federal antitrust laws but is based upon the fiduciary duty of corporate man­
agement created by the general corporation law of the state.209 Thus, a de­
rivative action based upon this duty and a violation of that duty by antitrust 
violations is not subject to the limiting language found in provisions of state 
and federal antitrust laws authorizing private antitrust remedies. Just as de­
rivative actions brought under federal and state antitrust laws against corpor­
ate officers and directors can be an effective antitrust remedy, so too derivative 
actions for breach of a fiduciary duty based on antitrust violations may be a 
useful and, in some ways,210 advantageous remedy for private antitrust en­
forcement.
In view of the existing chaos in state antitrust legislation concerning private 
injunctive relief and the general need for private antitrust enforcement, a uni­
form state antitrust law should contain a clear-cut authorization for private 
injunctive relief by any person threatened by antitrust violations. The Tenta­
tive Draft of a Uniform State Antitrust Act authorizes private injunctive relief 
in substantially the same language as that used by section 16 of the Clayton 
Act.211 A  “person” is authorized to “institute proceedings for injunctive relief, 
temporary or permanent. . .  against threatening loss or damage to his property 
or business by a violation of this Act.”212 To avoid the problem encountered
3)0 Comment, Federal Antitrust Law —  Stockholders’ Remedies for Corporate In­
jury Resulting From Antitrust Violations: Derivative Antitrust Suit and Fiduciary Duty 
Action, 59 M ic h . L. R ev . 904 ( 19 6 1 ).
507 De Koven v. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry., 216 F. 955, 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1914). See 
also Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 41 Del. Ch. 78, 188 A.2d 125 (Sup. Ct. 1963) 
(damage action for committing an alleged ultra vires act).
Comment, supra note 206, at 913. The “electrical conspiracy” cases have 
spawned some derivative actions of this type. See Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 41 
Del. Ch. 78, 188 A.2d 125 (Sup. Ct. 1963) (directors held not liable because of a failure 
to prove their knowledge of the activity violating the antitrust laws).
^  See Meyer v. Kansas City So. Ry., 84 F.2d 411 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 299 U.S. 
607 (1936); Gomberg v. Midvale Co., 157 F. Supp. 132 (E.D. Pa. 1955).
310 For limitations upon actions brought under the antitrust laws, see Blake, The 
Shareholders* Role in Antitrust Enforcement, 110 U. P a . L. R e v . 143 (1961); Note 
Stockholders* Suits and the Sherman Act, 5 S t a n . L. R e v . 480 (1953).
“ Tentative Draft of Uniform State Antitrust Act § 15, 4 T r a d e  R e g . R e p . 
30,101, at 35,155 (1965).
115 Id. The other proposed Uniform State Antitrust Law uses the language “ to 
enjoin further violations.”  Stem, A Proposed Uniform State Antitrust Law: Text and 
Commentary On a Draft Statute, 39 T e x a s  L. R e v . 717, 726 (1961). Professor R a h l ’ s 
proposals for inclusion in a state law do not contain authorization for private injunctive 
relief. See R a h l ,  Toward a Worthwhile State Antitrust Policy, 39 T e x a s  L. R e v . 753, 
780 (1961).
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under section 16 of the Clayton Act, the language of a uniform act should not 
be phrased negatively. Moreover, the use of the word “threatening35 instead 
of “threatened” in the proposed act implies a higher standard of proof of the 
immediacy of the harm without any justifying explanation. A uniform state 
antitrust act should also consider the express authorization of shareholder de­
rivative suits. By authorizing such suits and by simplifying derivative suit pro­
cedures a generally untapped source of private antitrust enforcement would 
be encouraged.
The proposed Uniform Act does provide for compensation of a successful 
plaintiff in injunction cases for his costs and reasonable attorney fees.213 In 
this respect, the Act is an important step beyond section 16 of the Clayton Act 
in which costs and attorney fees are not awarded the successful plaintiff. Since 
the cost of proving a case does not seem significantly less in state equity cases 
than it is in treble damage cases,214 private enforcement in equity will be en­
couraged by relieving the plaintiff who succeeds in proving his case from the 
heavy expenses normally attendant to most antitrust cases.
B. Temporary Injunctive Relief
Section 16 of the Clayton Act provides that “upon the execution of proper 
bond against damages for an injunction improvidently granted and a showing 
that the danger of irreparable loss or damage is immediate, a preliminary in­
junction may issue” at the instance of “[a]ny person, firm, corporation, or 
association” against “threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust 
laws.” 215 The federal courts have generally applied the same criteria for pri­
vate preliminary injunctions as have been applied in cases of public prelimi­
nary injunctions under section 4 of the Sherman Act and section 15 of the 
Clayton Act. The grant or denial of preliminary injunctive relief is largely in 
the discretion of the trial court;216 preliminary injunctive relief is not readily 
granted and when it is granted it is usually done to maintain the status quo 
or to prevent immediate or irreparable harm;217 the plaintiff must make out a 
prima facie case of violation or show a reasonable probability of success upon
“ Tentative Draft of Uniform State Antitrust Act § 15, supra note 211. See also 
H a w a i i  R e v . L a w s  § 205A-ll(b) (Supp. 1965).
214 In equity cases damages need not be proved nor is there a jury. These are the 
only factors which may decrease the expenses of such cases vis-a-vis treble damage cases.
21515 U.S.C. § 26 (1964).
218 National Screen Serv. Corp. v. Poster Exch., Inc., 305 F. 2d 647, 650 (5th Cir. 
1962); Texaco, Inc. v. Fiumara, 248 F. Supp. 595, 596 (E.D. Pa. 1965); see Hamilton 
Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738, 742 (2d Cir. 1953).
817 Bergen Drug Co. v. Parke, Davis & Co., 307 F.2d 725 (3d Cir. 1962); Warner 
Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Gittone, 110 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1940); see B & W Gas, Inc. v. 
General Gas Corp., 247 F. Supp. 339 (N.D. Ga. 1965). For an interesting case denying 
a preliminary injunction against the acquisition of the plaintiff firm by the defendant 
because maintenance of the status quo might have violated § 7 of the Clayton Act, see 
Lunkenheimer Co. v. Condec Corp., 5 T r a d e  R e g . R e p . (1967 Trade Cas.) If 72,095 
(S.D.N.Y.).
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full litigation;218 and, the court must balance the relative hardships to the 
parties in deciding whether preliminary injunctive relief should issue.219
In the leading case of Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co.,220 the 
late Judge Frank further developed the standards governing the grant or 
denial of preliminary injunctions in private antitrust cases. Judge Frank held 
that a plaintiffs right to a preliminary injunction is not predicated upon a 
' showing that the plaintiffs right to relief at the end of trial is "absolutely cer­
tain” and "without doubt,” 221 since the “judge’s legal conclusions, like his 
fact-findings, are subject to change after a full hearing and the opportunity for 
more deliberate deliberation.”222 The preliminary injunction is, “by its very 
nature, interlocutory, tentative, provisional, ad interim, impermanent, mut­
able, not fixed or final or conclusive” and “serves as an equitable policing 
measure to prevent the parties from harming one another during the litigation; 
to keep the parties while the suit goes on, as far as possible in the respective 
positions they occupied when the suit began.”223 When “the balance of hard­
ships tips decidedly toward” the plaintiff and the other elements are present, 
it will ordinarily be enough for preliminary injunctive relief “that the plaintiff 
has raised questions going to the merits so serious, substantial, difficult and 
doubtful, as to make them a fair ground for litigation and thus for more de­
liberate investigation.” 224 In determining whether the balance of hardships 
tips decidedly toward the plaintiff, the “judge must consider whether irrepar­
able harm is likely to result to [the] plaintiff if pendente lite (i.e.3 'immediate­
ly?) the injunction is denied, and against this harm he must balance the harm 
to [the] defendant likely to result if the relief is granted.” 225 Since the “hard­
ship plaintiff will suffer . . . may make interlocutory relief imperative where 
the same showing at a final hearing would not outweigh the hardship the de­
fendant would suffer from a permanent injunction . . . the factor of relative 
hardship is measured, on an application for interlocutory injunction, with a 
different yardstick from that used at final hearing.”226
A  few state antitrust laws expressly authorize preliminary injunctive relief 
at the instance of private parties;227 the courts of other states have held that
318 H.E. Fletcher Go. v. Rock of Ages Corp., 326 F.2d 13, 17 (2d Cir. 1963); 
Crane Co. v. Briggs Mfg. Co., 280 F.2d 747 (6th Cir. 1960) ;  Hamilton Watch Co. v. 
Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953); McKesson & Robbins, Inc. v. Charles 
Pfizer & Co., 235 F. Supp. 743 (E.D. Pa. 1964); Deltown Foods, Inc. v. Tropicana 
Prods., Inc., 219 F. Supp. 887, 891 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Yonkers Raceway, Inc. v. Stand- 
ardbred Owners Ass’n, Inc., 153 F. Supp. 552 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
110 See, e.g., National Screen Serv. Corp. v. Poster Exch., Inc., 305 F.2d 647 (5th 
Cir. 1962); Maryland Cas. Co. v. American Gen. Ins. Co., 232 F. Supp. 620 (D.D.C.
1964): Vanadium Corp. of America v. Susquehanna Corp.", 203 F. Supp. 686 (D. Del. 
1962). . ' ' ’ , ,
. 250 206 F.2d 738 (2dCir. 1953).. ' . ’
331 Id. at 740. -
321 Id. at 742. •
853 Id.
*** Id. at 740 (footnote omitted).
535 Id. at 743 (footnotes omitted); see Ingram v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 259 F. 
Supp. 176 (D.N.M. 1966).
206 F.2d at 743 (quoting R e s t a t e m e n t  o f  T o r t s  § 941, comment f  (1939)).
327L a .  R e v .  S t a t .  A n n . § 51:129 (1965). The Virginia antimonopoly law author­
izes permanent and preliminary injunctions upon the petition of ten or more citizens of
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preliminary injunctive relief is available to private litigants although the state 
antitrust law does not expressly provide for such relief.228 In states in which 
the question of preliminary injunctive relief has not been presented, the fact 
that state courts have granted permanent injunctive relief for antitrust viola­
tions despite the absence of statutory authority indicates that the lesser step of 
preliminary injunctive relief would also be granted if a meritorious case were 
presented.229 The grounds for invoking private preliminary injunctive relief 
at the state level, albeit the cases are few and far between, seem to parallel the 
standards followed by the federal courts.
At the federal level private preliminary injunctive relief has been requested 
in three types of cases: concerted refusals to deal,230 merger cases allegedly 
violating section 7 of the Clayton Act,231 and unilateral refusals to deal with 
plaintiffs by their defendant suppliers because the plaintiffs have brought treble 
damage suits for antitrust violations.232 In these types of antitrust cases the 
immediacy of the damage and its irreparable harm often demand preliminary 
judicial action. In cases of concerted refusals to deal, incalculable and irre­
parable harm may be done before full litigation of the antitrust case is possible 
since the very nature of the conduct entails the foreclosure of either the plain­
tiff’s source of supply233 or market outlets.234 In merger cases a peril is often 
imminent because the defendant may be able to absorb the plaintiff before full 
litigation on the merits is held,235 or because injury to the supplier and distri­
butor relationships, financial standing, good will, general business relationships, 
and employee morale of the business being acquired far outweigh the injury 
to the acquiring company caused by temporary delay in the merger.236
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any county or city. V a . C od e  A n n . § 59-32 (1950). The language of the Hawaii anti­
trust law and the Washington antitrust law seem broad enough to authorize private pre­
liminary injunctions, although they do not expressly authorize such relief. H a w a ii  R e v . 
L a w s  § 205A-ll(b) (Supp. 1965); W a s h . R e v . C o d e  A n n . § 19.86.090 (Supp. 1966).
2=8 See cases cited note 17 supra.
428 Id.
230 See, e.g., Yonkers Raceway, Inc. v. Standardbred Owners Ass’n, Inc., 153 F. 
Supp. 552 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Evening News Publishing Co. v. Allied Newspaper Carriers,
149 F. Supp. 460 (D.N.J. 1957), cert, denied, 360 U.S. 929 (1959).
231 See, e.g., Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir.
1953); Vanadium Corp. of America v. Susquehanna Corp., 203 F. Supp. 686 (D. Del.
1962).
834 See, e.g., Klein v. American Luggage Works, Inc., 206 F. Supp. 924 (D. Del.
1962), reifd, 323 F.2d 787 (3d Cir. 1963); McKesson & Robbins, Inc. v. Charles
Pfizer & Co., 235 F. Supp. 743 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
733 See, e.g., Yonkers Raceway, Inc. v. Standardbred Owners Ass’n, Inc., 153 F.
Supp. 552 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (racehorses for plaintiffs race track). In Graham v. Tri­
angle Publications, Inc., 344 F.2d 775 (3d Cir. 1965), the court affirmed a trial court
refusal to issue a preliminary injunction against a refusal to deal on the theory that the
plaintiffs damages were readily ascertainable.
134 See, e.g., Evening News Publishing Go. v. Allied Newspaper Carriers, 149 F.
Supp. 460 (D.N.J. 1957), cert, denied, 360 U.S. 929 (1959) (distributors of news­
papers).
*** See, e.g., Muskegon Piston Ring Co. v. Gulf & Western Indus., Inc., 328 F.2d
830 (6th Cir. 1964); Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir.
1953).
326 See, e.g., Crane Co. v. Briggs Mfg. Co., 280 F.2d 747 (6th Cir. 1960); Vana­
dium Corp. of America v. Susquehanna Corp., 203 F. Supp. 686 (D. Del. 1962).
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Temporarily enjoining unilateral refusals to deal with treble damage plain­
tiffs, a far more troublesome question,237 is often argued to be necessary be­
cause of the irreparable harm caused by depriving a retailer of a name product 
essential to the retailer’s business,238 or because the peculiarities of the plain­
tiffs business demand that the plaintiff have defendant’s line of products,239 
or because the defendant represents the sole source of supply of a particular 
product the plaintiff claims is necessary to his business.240 While the hardship 
to the plaintiff may be clearly demonstrated, the plaintiff’s equities usually 
stumble over the long-recognized, but increasingly narrowed, Colgate doc­
trine241 preserving the "right of [a] trader or manufacturer engaged in an en­
tirely private business . . .  to exercise his own independent discretion as to par­
ties with whom he will deal.” 242 Preliminary injunctions under section 16 of 
the Clayton Act for unilateral refusals to deal which are used to discourage 
treble damage suits, therefore, encounter the obvious difficulty of not meeting 
an express requirement of section 16: a showing of an antitrust violation. For, 
if the Colgate doctrine still has any vitality, it clearly means that a truly uni­
lateral refusal to deal is not a “contract, combination, or conspiracy” and there­
fore does not violate the antitrust laws despite its coercive economic effect,243
537 See generally Alexander, Private Antitrust Actions for Refusal To Deal, 6 S t . 
Lours U.L.J. 489 (1961); Comment, Unilateral Refusals To Deal as a Method of De­
terring Private Antitrust Litigants: A Legitimate Method of Economic Coercion?, 42 
N e b . L. R e v . 825 (1963); Comment, Refusals To Deal with Antitrust Suitors: “ Doric 
Simplicity”  or “ Dirty Pool’1?, 39 U. D e t . L.J. 414 (1962).
8:3 P.W. Husserl, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 191 F. Supp. 55, 63 (S.D.N.Y.
1961), rev3d sub nom., House of Materials, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 298 F.2d 
867 (2d Cir. 1962) ;  Airfix Corp. of America v. Aurora Plastics Corp., 222 F. Supp. 703 
(E.D. Pa. 1963).
^  See, e.g., Bergen Drug Co. v. Parke, Davis & Co., 307 F.2d 725 (3d Cir. 1962) ;  
McKesson & Robbins, Inc. v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 235 F. Supp. 743 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
140 See, e.g., H.E. Fletcher Co. v. Rock of Ages Corp., 326 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1963); 
National Screen Serv. Corp. v. Poster Exch., Inc., 305 F.2d 647 (5th Cir. 1962).
2a United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919). The Supreme Court has 
gradually been narrowing the scope of the Colgate doctrine in a long series of cases. 
See, e.g., United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 729 (1944); 
United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960). Judge McLean has suggested 
that the “Colgate case has been in failing health for years, and may be found, when the 
question next arises in the Supreme Court, to have expired completely.” Julius M. Ames 
Co. v. Bostitch, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 521, 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). Section 2(a) of the 
Clayton Act, however, is some evidence of congressional approval of unilateral refusals 
to deal: “That nothing herein contained shall prevent persons engaged in selling goods, 
wares, or merchandise in commerce from selecting their own customers in bona fide 
transactions and not in restraint of trade . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964). Since the 
proviso is part of the Robinson-Patman Act and uses the words “nothing herein con­
tained,”  it may be also argued that the preservation of unilateral refusals to deal only 
applies to Robinson-Patman Act cases and Congress implicitly rejected the doctrine 
under other major antitrust laws.
250 U.S. at 307. For excellent studies of the unilateral refusal to deal see Barber, 
Refusals To Deal Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 103 U. Pa . L. R e v . 847 (1955); 
T u rn er , The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism 
and Refusals To Deal, 75 H a r v . L. R e v . 655 (1962). T h e  right to refuse to deal is 
generally more limited in regulated industries, particularly where the regulated industry 
is a monopoly. See Parker, Individual Refusals To Sell in Regulated Industries, 41 
T e x a s  L. R e v . 295 (1962).
20 See, e.g., Klein v. American Luggage Works, Inc., 323 F.2d 787 (3d Cir. 1963); 
House of Materials, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 298 F.2d 867, 872 (2d Cir. 1962). 
But see Bergen Drug Co. v. Parke, Davis & Co., 307 F.2d 725 (3d Cir. 1962),* McKesson
& Robbins, Inc. v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 235 F. Supp. 743, 746 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
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unless the refusal to deal has some aspect of concerted action or is done pur­
suant to a scheme of monopolization or an attempt to monopolize.244
Yet there is undeniable appeal to the argument favoring injunctive relief 
under these circumstances. The “right” of business to refuse to deal is not 
a basic constitutional right and has been limited in areas where paramount 
public policy dictates a limitation or elimination of the right to secure some 
greater public good such as automobile franchising,245 labor relations,246 and 
civil rights.247 Perhaps the Colgate doctrine should be viewed in light of the 
historic limitation of the power of equity courts — the impossibility of enforc­
ing the equity decree — rather than as a sanctified right of modem business. 
This should be particularly true where the business relationship involved is 
largely a mechanical relationship based upon standard operating procedures 
rather than a closely-knit relationship based upon trust, confidence, and re­
liability which would require continual judicial supervision.248 When the pub­
lic policy inherent in the enforcement of the antitrust laws, particularly treble 
damage suits,249 is weighed against the largely psychological inconvenience and 
dislike of compulsion to deal with a person bringing a treble damage action, 
the impossibility of effective enforcement of the injunction without continual 
supervision should be the only limitation upon injunctive relief.250 When, of 
course, factors other than merely the plaintiff’s treble damage suit justify the 
refusal to deal,251 or enforcement of the degree would be difficult or impos­
sible,252 or the plaintiff’s damages would not be excessively grave and irrepar­
able,253 the values inherent in a business’s freedom to refuse to deal should 
outweigh the plaintiff’s inconveniences and the policy in favor of treble dam­
ages enforcement.
^Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 150 (1951). Simpson v. 
Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964), may have opened a new theory of attacking uni­
lateral refusals to deal which would not necessarily require a showing of conduct viola­
tive of § 2 of the Sherman Act. See Note, “ Combinations”  in Restraint of Trade: A New 
Approach to Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 1966 U t a h  L. R e v . 75. See also Quinn v. 
Mobil Oil Co., 375 F.2d 273 (1st Cir. 1967).
215 Automobile Dealers’ Day in Court Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221—25 (1964).
2,3 See Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 159, 160 (1964).
2,1 Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-l to h-6 (1964).
28 In Weingartner v. Union Oil Co., 1966 Trade Gas. 71,757 at 82,501 (N.D. 
Cal. 1965), the court implicitly adopted this standard in preliminarily enjoining a re­
fusal to deal with a treble-damage plaintiff.
213 See Loevinger, Private Action — The Strongest Pillar of Antitrust, 3 A n t it r u s t  
B u l l . 167 (1958).
2=0 See Bergen Drug Go. v. Parke, Davis & Co., 307 F.2d 725 (3d Cir. 1962). 
Contra, House of Materials, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 298 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1962).
2=1 Cf. Klein v. American Luggage Works, Inc., 323 F.2d 787 (3d Cir. 1963) 
(plaintiff’s price cutting disrupted defendant’s other retail outlets).
253 Cf. H.E. Fletcher Co. v. Rock of Ages Corp., 326 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1963), in 
which the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court injunction ordering defendant, 
who controlled the only source of supply, to furnish plaintiff with a particular color of 
marble required by a government contract.
253 In House of Materials, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 298 F.2d 867 (2d Cir.
1962), six of the original forty-one parties in the initial spurious class action, see P.W. 
Husserl, Inc. v. Newman, 25 F.R.D. 264 (S.D.N.Y. I960) (treble damage suit) re­
quested temporary injunctive relief following the Supreme Court’s affirmance of an
F.T.C. cease and desist order against Simplicity. See FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 
360 U.S. 55 (1959). Only Husserl pursued injunctive relief since the five other plain­
tiffs found different sources for dress patterns. When other sources for the product are
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So long as the Colgate doctrine continues to have some vitality, suits to 
enjoin purely unilateral refusals to deal with antitrust treble damage plain­
tiffs cannot be brought under section 16 of the Clayton Act. Temporary equi­
table relief in the form of a preliminary injunction should be available in the 
proper case, however, under the general equity powers of a court to preserve 
the status quo and prevent irreparable harm, and to protect the jurisdiction 
of the court over the treble damage suit.254
At the state level there has been relatively little development of private 
preliminary injunctive relief in antitrust cases. The general failure of public 
and private enforcement of state antitrust laws rather than a lack of necessity 
for private preliminary injunctive relief seems to be the primary explanation 
for the paucity of litigation. Assuming state antitrust enforcement by both 
public officials and private individuals is desirable and takes place, state anti­
trust laws should include express authorization for private preliminary injunc­
tive relief. Since many local restraints of trade tend to be of the predatory and 
vicious per se type,255 private enforcement by preliminary and permanent in­
junctive relief should be expressly authorized to prevent irreparable harm and 
to encourage private action as a supplement to public enforcement.
V. C o n c l u s io n s
Any survey of a legal topic necessarily tends to be summary in nature and 
legalistic in form, and on occasion the reader is lost in the web of legalisms or 
the morass of plentiful footnotes. It is hoped that upon being freed of these en­
tanglements, some of the broader implications of this study may become ap­
parent.
One of the unique characteristics of American antitrust enforcement has 
been the forum of enforcement and the remedies available to enforcement offi­
cials and private parties. In the main, traditional antitrust enforcement has 
been carried on in courts of general jurisdiction rather than in specialized 
courts, as in England, or solely by administrative agencies. Even the admini­
strative decisions of the Federal Trade Commission are subject to extensive 
judicial review. In addition, private parties have carried a portion of the 
enforcement burden, either by suits in equity or by treble damage claims.
One may question whether this is an intelligent manner in which to im­
plement government economic regulation or whether the implementation of 
over-all economic policy can be effectively coordinated when the tools for im­
plementing that policy are scattered over three constitutionally independent 
branches of government. There is, of course, logical appeal— to the Ameri­
can mind at least — in the idea that there is virtue in dispersing political power 
and that concentrated economic power is dangerous to the health of the body 
politic. Consequently, in addition to the inertia of tradition and vested politi­
available the plaintiff’s damage should not ordinarily be considered irreparable. The 
economic peculiarities of a particular business, however, may make the defendant’s 
particular product essential to the plaintiffs business. See Bergen Drug Co. v. Parke, 
Davis & Co., 307 F.2d 725 (3d Cir. 1962). This case has been criticized. 76 H arv. L. 
R ev. 848 (1963).
** Bergen Drug Co. v. Parke, Davis & Co., 30 7  F .2 d  725  (3 d  Cir. 1 9 6 2 ) . 
a  See J. F l y n n , F e d e r a l is m  a n d  S t a t e  A n t it r u s t  R e g u l a t io n  2 2 8 -3 0  (1 9 6 4 ) .
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cal interest, any suggestion that antitrust enforcement take place in a forum 
other than a judicial one or that antitrust remedies be implemented without 
the imprimatur of a judicial decree must be accommodated to basic American 
political and economic beliefs.
Yet the limitations of the judicial process and the adversary system make 
antitrust enforcement in the courts somewhat less than satisfactory. This be­
comes particularly clear when one surveys equitable relief under the antitrust 
laws. The vast majority of government civil cases are terminated by consent 
decrees; injunctive decrees arrived at with little judicial involvement aside 
from the ritualistic stamping of the decree by the court as a judicially entered 
injunction. When litigation does occur, the court is usually faced with a pro­
tracted and complicated trial involving highly sophisticated economic and 
business issues with far-reaching economic consequences. Many courts have 
professed reluctance to exercise the full scope of their power in light of the 
complexities of the issues and the long range implications of issuing a decree 
based on anything other than expertise in the particular business involved. 
Yet in many cases, particularly cases involving structural problems, radical sur­
gery is necessary to cure the particular antitrust violations that have occurred 
and to eliminate a recurring source of future antitrust violations.
Considerable thought and empirical research should be undertaken on the 
question of whether public remedial relief in antitrust cases can be better im­
plemented by a different tribunal than a court applying remedies within the 
framework of equity jurisdiction. While it is probably unfeasible and unde­
sirable to remove totally this aspect of antitrust enforcement from the adver­
sary system, judicial involvement could be minimized by further refinement of 
the consent decree process. Judicial timidity to order far-reaching antitrust 
relief in litigated cases may be minimized by making greater use of the advisory 
function of the F.T.C.256 in framing antitrust equity decrees. Improvement of 
the consent decree process might include a greater awareness of its potential, 
a broader standard of intervention for interested parties when the decree has 
industry-wide implications, and a greater willingness of the enforcement agen­
cies to devote additional resources to the formulation and enforcement of de­
crees. F.T.C. involvement in formulating decrees in Antitrust Division cases 
can only come about after the development of better cooperation by the Com­
mission and the Division and a relatively massive infusion of funds into the 
F.T.C. to expand and improve its undermanned staff.257 This last named fac­
tor can only be solved by Congress, which exercises a well known but seldom 
mentioned restraint upon antitrust enforcement by its control of the purse.
At the state level there are signs of a revival of state antitrust law enforce­
ment. Many state statutes, however, are in serious need of revision. The sub­
stantive language of many is confusing and archaic, the procedures for en­
forcing others are strange and antiquated, and the remedies of others are ex­
*“  Federal Trade Commission Act § 6(e), 15 U.S.C. §§ 46(e), 47 (1964).
See Elman, Antitrust Enforcement: Retrospect and Prospect, 53 A.B.A.J. 609 
(1967).
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cessive or incomplete.258 If state antitrust enforcement is to be revived, most 
state antitrust statutes must be substantially updated to ensure conformity to 
current practice and to ensure that the “remedy fits the crime.” A survey of 
state antitrust equitable relief reveals a confusing morass of differing legal 
standards and varying substantive coverage. In the area of equitable relief the 
Tentative Draft of a Proposed Uniform State Antitrust Law — with some mi­
nor modifications— is an important step in the direction of updating state 
antitrust statutes to useful and workable tools for local antitrust enforcement.
5:3 C.H. Albers Comm’n Co. v. Spencer, 205 Mo. 105, 103 S.W. 523 (1907), re­
hearing denied sub nom., C.H. Albers Comm’n Co. v. Milliken, 245 Mo. 368, 150 S.W. 
712 (1912), appeal dismissed per curiam for want of jurisdiction, 232 U.S. 719 (1913), 
in which lie  failure to include injunctive relief as a private antitrust remedy led the 
Missouri Supreme Court to hold that the damage remedy authorized by the statute was 
exclusive.
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